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Monism and Melionism

78

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

From Prof. H. C. Adams
July 1887

Price, 75 Cents.

MONISM AND MELIORISM,

A

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY

ON

CAUSALITY AND ETHICS.

BY

PAUL CARUS,

PH. D. (TÜBINGEN).

Ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ χαρίσματα τὰ κρείτονα·
καὶ ἔτι καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὁδὸν ὑμῖν δείκνυμι.
1 Corinth. xii. 31.

NEW YORK:
F. W. CHRISTERN, 37 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PAGES.

PREFACE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5–7

SECTION I.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY - - - - - - - - - - - 9–28

SECTION II.

CAUSALITY - - - - - - - - - - - - - 29–44

SECTION III.

FIRST CAUSE AND FINAL CAUSE - - - - - - - 45–55

SECTION IV.

THE TRINITY OF MONISM - - - - - - - - - 56–63

SECTION V.

ETHICS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 64–77

DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS - - - - - - - 78–83

PREFACE.

I DELIVER to the American public a philosophical system, comprised under the name of *Monism and Meliorism*,* two words which have been used by different philosophers, and which, for some time, have indicated, as it were, the direction of the development of philosophic thought.

Monism is the ideal which no one hitherto has been able to realize satisfactorily, though many have tried to do so. It has become, therefore, the watch-word of diverse parties, who lacked the solid basis, on which to erect the building of such a conception of the world, as might be well founded in its cornerstone and harmonious in its structure.

The cornerstone to be chosen is *causality* and the only criterion by which any philosophical theory can be tested and verified, is given in its doctrine of *ethics*. But on both subjects the greatest confusion prevails, both of them being problems, which still wait for a definite solution. And after so many attempts, a new solution, in consonance with modern science, by which the old controversies may be reconciled, is extremely desirable.

The novelty of the solution here proposed does not consist in bringing forward new and startling views; quite the contrary! The

* We define *Monism* as a conception of the world which traces all things back to one source, thus explaining all problems from one principle; and *Meliorism* as a contemplation of life, which refusing optimism as well as pessimism, finds the purpose of living in the aspiration of a constant progress to some higher state of existence; in one word, in perpetual labor for amelioration.

true philosopher must endeavor to avoid originality as much as possible, and cling with full concentration of mind to impartial investigation. Original ideas often allure and dazzle with a fine brilliancy, but they are treacherous owing to the very subjectivity which renders them so attractive. Objectivity in philosophical research does not create a sensation, as it does not take men's fancy; yet, its results, if true, will stand forever. And this disinterested, impartial objectivity will shed a new light on questions, which, difficult in themselves, have been confounded and entangled by the hatred and struggle of obtruding and intervening interests.

The latest step taken by the progressive party in philosophy, is the theory of the *Positive School*, founded by M. Auguste Comte, supported by Mr. John Stuart Mill and in closest relation to the system of Mr. Herbert Spencer. These gentlemen say that positivism has taken its stand on positive facts. But Comte forgot the main point. He did not give any touchstone, which would enable us to distinguish, whether we have to deal with positive facts or with illusions. Kant did not overlook this difficulty, and it was through no mere child's play that he took such a seemingly roundabout way. If he did not succeed, it was merely because he lost himself in the intricate paths and windings of his strange idealism and abandoned the problem of *causality*, from which alone the solution of philosophical questions can be expected.

Convinced of the importance of this topic, I venture an attempt at unravelling its Gordian knot. Cutting the knot will not do in philosophy, as it certainly would in politics; and so we have to disentangle its intricacies carefully and patiently, in hope that after all they may be simpler than they seem to be.

The present essay contains the chief points of my argument and I sincerily trust that I have succeeded so far as to have realized what David Hume and Immanuel Kant planned, and to have brought to

a certain consummation what they intended to do. I hold that this *philosophy of Monism and Meliorism* will prove the natural outcome of former systems and will clear away many difficulties seemingly insurmountable.

The plan of this little essay contains five articles, the first of which is on Kant, being merely an introduction, and, so to say, the pedestal of the others, in which the new theories are propounded. *Causality* is the beginning, *ethics* the aim and end of this philosophy. These two points being fixed, the whole system is sketched in its outlines. All other questions are of minor importance and may find their answers by simply drawing inferences from what has been stated on causality and ethics.

It is superfluous to crave indulgence, where I may possibly have been mistaken. The task is difficult and greater men than I have erred regarding the same topics which I treat in this little pamphlet.

If Kant compared his work to that of Copernicus, I may fairly liken mine to that of Kepler who filled out the Copernican system and reduced the law of motion of planets to simple mathematical formulæ. The future will show whether my confidence is justified or not. Should it prove excessive, I hope, at least, that this essay will do something to further and give impulse to the solution of the deepest, the most important and the most difficult problem of life, so that my work shall not have been entirely in vain, nor my labor altogether wasted.

NEW YORK, 1885.

THE AUTHOR.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.*

§ 1. KANT'S REVOLUTION IN THE EMPIRE OF PHILOSOPHY.

KANT'S greatness need not be praised; it is known and acknowledged wherever philosophy is studied, and its enormous influence on the development of Germany directly and of humanity indirectly may be perceived in literature as well as in the policy of Church and State.

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* marks the beginning of a new era and, at the same time, the conclusion of a period longer than a thousand years. What Luther did for religion, and Copernicus for science, Kant has done for philosophic thought. He is the representative of the revolutionary spirit of the eighteenth century, which produced new humanitarian ideals and a new arrangement of society. In France the old throne of the Bourbons was overturned, and in America, for the first time, a republic was founded on the basis of individual freedom and human rights. A deep, wide ocean lies between the quiet town of Königsberg, where the German philosopher dwelt, and the shores of New England. But in spite of the distance, in spite of the physical gap, the movements on both sides were the result of the same cause; and, occurring in the same century, were, at the same time, psychically connected with each other. However, while the revolution in France was social, and that of America political, the revolution inaugurated by Kant was philosophic.

* This Lecture is not intended to explain the system and argumentation, but merely the drift and tendency of Kantian philosophy.

The earthquake of the French revolution was on the surface; that of Germany lay deeper, though its results were not perceived so quickly as those experienced under the terrorism in the noisy capital on the banks of the Seine. Kant reversed the basis, on which human knowledge and the ideas of "*Soul, World and God*" rested. He reversed it, and, *pari passu*, gave the development of human thought a new direction. Therefore he was more than a mere revolutionist. Robespierre and his gang destroyed, but were unable to build anew.

Kant cleared the place where the rotten edifice of metaphysics had stood so long, and at the same time contrived a plan for constructing another and a better building, which, as expressed by himself, would not prove so lofty a structure, as the dome of ontologic thought had been, the bold spire of which was raised to the clouds. The edifice he proposed to build could be likened to a mansion, neither high nor grand, without steeples or battlements, but simple and plain, just fit to live in. The systems of philosophy before Kant, though divine and magnificent, like the Gothic cathedral of the Middle ages, were castles in the air, enchantingly splendid, but unsubstantial and transient like the *Fata Morgana*. Kant's philosophy is neither showy nor pretentious, but as a compensation it has the great merit of solidity.

Before I enter into details, let me mention that such a subject as Kantian philosophy can scarcely be exhausted. If I venture on so broad a field, devoting no more space to it than one article allows, I shall have to limit myself, or we shall be lost in the innumerable windings of a labyrinth. I shall confine myself, therefore, to one of the principal points, which, though openly laid down in Kant's works, has been hitherto rather too much neglected. I mean his *dualism;* it, I maintain, has been overlooked, under-

rated and misinterpreted by many of his disciples and followers, and has usually been regarded as his blind side. This dualism of Kant's will, I trust, prove to be the key to his philosophy and give us admittance to the work-shop of his strange ideas.

Speaking of Kant, I run the risk of being attacked by at least half of his adherents, for, as the Bible is interpreted differently by different confessions and sects, so Kant's philosophy has been explained by different men in different ways, which are often contrary, and even sometimes contradictory, to each other. Such a lack of harmony, however, proves how little hitherto the Königsberg philosopher has been understood, and how far our time is from having outgrown or encompassed the gigantic expanse of his thought.

§ 2. KANT'S CRITICISM IS A COMBINATION OF HUME'S SCEPTICISM AND WOLF'S DOGMATISM.

Everywhere we perceive in this world antagonistic principles at war with each other. For instance, in the formation of the earth two forces are active, the centripetal and the centrifugal. And so similar principles, opposed to each other, govern the growth of social and political life; everywhere there are Whigs and Tories, Republicans and Democrats, under diverse names. The same fact we perceive in the empire of philosophic thought, and its development seems to swing to and fro like a pendulum between the two extremes, giving ascendency now to this and now to that one. And from this very antagonism of hostile principles there starts order and arrangement. Both principles, seemingly incompatible and irreconcilable, tend to the same end and each is indispensable in the system produced by their struggle.

The antagonistic principles in philosophy were in their extremes *Spiritualism*, as propounded by Berkeley, and *Materialism*, as defended by Condillac, Holbach, and their French friends. In a similar way, though more moderately, it is shown to-day in the *Realism* of modern science and the *Idealism* of transcendental philosophy.

One of these antagonistic principles, the materialism of the French School, was developed in the more cautious English mind of Locke as *Sensualism*, based on the doctrine: *Nihil est in intellectu, quod non antea fuerit in sensu.* And this denial of any subjective basis of knowledge in the human mind, or as they used to express it, of *innate ideas*, led as a natural consequence to *Hume's scepticism.* Simultaneously Leibnitz's idealism in Germany became crystalised into the systematic structure of Wolf's *dogmatism.* And this opposition between the British scepticism and the German dogmatism gave rise to Kant's *criticism.* Being born of a union of these bitter enemies, his philosophy shows traces of both; and as they are propounded independently of and even in a clearly exhibited opposition to each other, we may call Kant's system fairly *dualistic.*

It was perhaps the most difficult task for Kant's interpreters to harmonize the antagonistic principles and make the very contradictory views which he stated agree. Some tried to deny the dualism, some eliminated the contradictions in one way or another, but only a few, if any at all, openly accepted and acknowledged it. Even Kuno Fischer, who is perhaps his most impartial interpreter, is cautious about depicting Kant so fundamentally, dualistic as he is, and treats his *antinomies* as a kind of subordinate part in his system.

Many-sided as he was, Kant suggested more than he taught. His ideas are rather innuendoes than decisions. Thus he incorporated the antagonistic principles of his

time in his philosophy, but left the working out of the solution to posterity. However there was no one to undertake this task, especially as in Germany a powerful reaction ensued through Hegel; and so every one took from Kant what he pleased and left all other things of his alone. Thus Kant gave on one hand a solid basis to build upon, yet no dogmatic system; and on the other hand, just by his want of dogmatism, his critical method invited and induced men of different turns of mind and even of opposite directions to make use of his materials. Every one found or could at least find something that suited him. There were on the one side the philosophers of creed and faith, *die Glaubensphilosophen*, for instance Heinrich Jacobi; on the other extreme, atheists traced their very atheism back to Kant.

In the same way all schools after Socrates took their start from him, and this fact alone is sufficient to show that both Socrates in Grecian times and Kant in our modern days commenced a new epoch. Although the period after Socrates can boast of many glorious names, as Plato, Aristotle, Hippocrates, Epicurus, and others, yet I do not believe that it was a time of advancement and actual progress. It went into decay at length, losing itself in the nonsence of the mysticism of Neo-Platonism. And why? Because of the one-sidedness of the Grecian philosophers. After Socrates there rose no one who aspired to combine all the antagonistic principles and give each of them its due. There was no one bold enough to lead the *maiotic* (μαιωτικός) method of Socrates to a *monism* in which the controversies of the past could acquiesce.

Let us learn from old Greece. What we need in our days is neither Radicalism nor the philosophy of creed and faith, but both united. The mere radicalism which leaves the heart empty, will breed superstition as a

substitute for the loss of religion; and the philosophy of creed and faith, demanding (as Prof. Stahl really did) that science should return to belief, leads to bigotry. And does not the spiritualism of our days remind us very much of the Neo-Platonism of ancient history? So one-sidedness tends to the same end. At length it will make philosophy a scientificated superstition. So the need of our time is not to declare in favor of either of the opposed principles and, at the same time, to flatly deny the right of the contrary. No! We must investigate both carefully, in hope that from a higher view they may be reconcilable and conformable.

Granted that Kant failed, as I think he did, in combining both standpoints into a higher unity, yet he showed in what direction the philosophic development tended. Therefore it is *not the results* of his philosophy that make him great and give importance to his ideas, but his *method*. Philosophers, however, like Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, who imagined that they could easily dispense with Kant, are entirely mistaken. Though Comte and his adherents condemn Kant simply as a metaphysical philosopher, and propose what they call Positivism, a philosophy of utmost radicalism, as they thought, it is clear that they lack critique and method. They overlooked the difficulty, as they did not fathom the depth of Kant; and, where Kant inquired carefully, weighing the *pros* and *cons*, they jumped at their conclusion. They endeavored to outdo each other in radicalism and had no idea, that their own radicalism was child's play compared with the radical thoroughness of Kantian Critique, in spite of all the conservatism which Kant exhibited at the same time.

Kant is a giant among his fellow philosophers, not merely because he startled the world with a new theory of space and time, not merely because his system is the

greatest puzzle to the world even to-day, and certainly not because he has given ascendency to the radical philosophy in the face of the dogmatic doctrines which were very powerful in Germany in his days. Kant was not the hero of one faction; he stood above parties and showed his greatness by embracing them all. His critical method is actually a principle of justice. The sceptic may have his say, but afterwards the dogmatist may be allowed to make the best of what is left and to construct his dogmas on the ruins of scepticism. In the Critique of pure reason, Kant is radical; he shows that time and space are no realities, that in consequence of that, the *world* as it exists in time and space is a mere phenomenon, and that *soul* as well as *God* are nothing but noumena—mere concepts. We fancy that we perceive in the world certain purposes proving the premeditative wisdom of a creator, but such a *teleology* or doctrine of purposes is an imagination and simply a paralogism of pure reason; for it is only according to the law of causality that the affairs of the world are regulated. Before Kant, no one was so radical and thorough, and yet this very same man propounds in his Critique of Practical Reason the three postulates, *God, Freedom and Immortality*, contradicting the results of his Critique of Pure Reason.

So Kant's philosophy appears to consist of two souls, the one sceptical and radical, the other dogmatic and believing. The greatest German poet of the same period, Wolfgang Goethe, in his philosophic poetry, makes Faust say to Wagner, who represents the philistine pedantry, and who, like all average men, has only one soul:

> "One impulse art thou conscious of at best,
> O never seek to know the other,
> Two souls, alas! reside within my breast,
> And each withdraws from and repels its brother."

Kant with his private character has not in the least impeached Goethe's idea of Faust. The more noteworthy it is that in describing a philosopher, the poet could not help imputing to him a dualism similar to that of Kant. Goethe had the same two souls within himself; and so has every great impartial man whose horizon reaches farther than that of the smaller creatures around and beneath him.

§ 3. WHICH IS THE REAL KANT?

Yet concerning this dualism in the Kantian philosophy, it is not astonishing that people were puzzled and asked, which is now the real Kant. Naturally, the Kantians are divided into two principal camps, the *radicals* and the *dogmatists*. Both of them stand upon Kant. But the radicals (for instance Schopenhauer) say, that the real Kant is the critical philosopher, who was, as they pretend, so weak that he was afraid of losing his professorship, and, therefore, stooped to hypocrisy. The orthodox party, however, to which belong the élite of Germany's philosophically trained clergymen, think that the Kant of the Practical Reason is the true Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason is merely written, they say, to show where human philosophy arrives, if left to drift in its isolation, without divine illumination. Therefore, they infer, God had to reveal himself, and so practical reason teaches us that we have simply to accept the fundamental facts of such a revelation as Christianity affords, namely, the ideas of *God*, *Freedom* (which means moral responsibility) and *Immortality*.

In answer to Schopenhauer and his adherents we must indeed concede that, when Kant was rebuked by the government, he yielded to the pressure and promised obedience. But this does not explain his dualism, as it

was prior to these persecutions; for he had nothing to fear under the rule of the liberal Frederick the Great. And when this reproof was made, Kant had already written all the essential books of his philosophy, and there is no reason for such a suspicion as that of Schopenhauer.*

The view taken by erudite theologians has scarcely ever been recognized among philosophers, as it savored too strongly of theology. Nevertheless, if it be allowed to philosophers to eliminate the practical side for the sake of harmony, why should not theologians be permitted to reject the theoretical part for the same reason? The men that do so, consider Kant as an agnostic. If nothing can be said definitely against the other world and another life, especially if nothing can be said in favor of, nor anything against, the existence of God, is it then not best, they say, simply to accept revelation as a satisfactory solution of the problem of life? Well, they may do so, and if they feel satisfied with their philosophy of faith and creed, they can entirely dispense with the Critique of Pure Reason. Of what use is it, if the predestined end is no science, but belief?!

Kant, to be sure, though he is not of the first named type, as the radicals interpret his philosophy, does not,

* Max Müller, in regard to the discord about the first and second edition of the Critique refutes these unjust intimations and accusations of Schopenhauer. He says: "The active reactionary measures by which Kant is supposed to have been frightened, date from a later period. Zedlitz, Kant's friend and protector, was not replaced by Wöllner as minister till 1788. It was not till 1794 that Kant was really warned and reprimanded by the cabinet; and we must not judge too harshly of the old philosopher, when at his time of life and in the state of paternal despotism in Prussia, he wrote back to say, that he would do even more than was demanded of him and abstain in future from all public lectures concerning religion, whether natural or revealed."

on the other hand, answer to the ideal of the second faction. His Critique of Pure Reason, sweeping and thoroughgoing as it is, was at least as sincere as that of the Practical Reason, which is constructive and conservative. There is no doubt that either both of these two parties are to be acknowledged as right and legitimate, or neither; and I think sufficient proof can be brought from some passages of Kant to convince any one that the real Kant is truly dualistic.

Before we proceed to this, let me briefly mention that I shall merely sketch in a popular way the views of these two parties, knowing very well that there are shades, by which many of the same group characterize themselves. However, I do not intend, here, to distinguish but to classify, and there is only time to rough-hew their opinions and draw the picture in broad general outlines.

Besides these two classes, who stand either on the critical or the dogmatic Kant, there are some other Kantians who may be named the elective party. The men belonging to it choose indiscriminately from Kant's ideas, just as they think fit. They are either *dilettanti*, or, if philosophers by profession, marked by a lack of consistency. No doubt we find prominent men among them. As an instance of this latter class may be named Professor Felix Adler of New York, a prominent man, of powerful oratory, and of sincerest aspirations, whose principal merit is undeniably the number of practical and useful institutions which he has created. His watch-word *Deed not creed!* is the true guiding star of his work. He is devoted to Kantian philosophy and professes to preach a religion of Pure Reason. He accepts from the Critique of Practical Reason the idea of freedom, the *Categoric imperative* being the basis of his ethics. In answer to some address on the subject of the poetry of the future, delivered before the Nineteenth Century Club in New

York, he defended the right of fiction and fictitious poetical personages such as fairies, gnomes and elves, to exist in the phantasy of our children, because, he said, poetry is based on the wants of our heart, and our heart will remain the same as it has ever been in spite of all scientific progress. Yet the idea of God he has banished from the nursery, as though God were no exigency of our heart —not even so much as any sprite or genius in the tales of the "Thousand and one Nights."

The first and second class of the Kantians perceived the dualism and got rid of it by elimination of either principal, the critical or the dogmatic. The elective Kantians, however, overlook entirely the import of Kant's dualism; and while I understand the first and second classes, I am quite at a loss to account for the inconsistency of the third class.

§ 4. KANT IS REALLY DUALISTIC.

According to my view, Kant was neither a hypocrite nor a coward, as Schopenhauer, our representative of the radical class, says; nor is his Critique of Pure Reason a mere sham-fight, as the philosophers of faith and creed thought. I believe that Kant was sincere as well in his radicalism as in his dogmatism. He was too thorough not to think his critical ideas to the end, and there he arrived at the abyss of atheism. However, the same Kant was too profound to stop here. His atheism was no blasphemy; and he was too good a critic—that is, he was too just—not to allow his opponent to have his say also. Pure reason is but half the soul of man. The other half, being the emotional part, has exactly the same right. And the God that lives in our hearts has not been touched and can not be touched by the critique of any pure reason. God, the phantom of religious fairy

tales, that personified ideal of the highest and best in man, that glorious idol, vanished before the light of scientific investigation like night-fog before the beams of the rising sun. It vanished and it must vanish as do the fairy tales in the child's brain.

I know of a man who, when a boy, wept bitterly, as he grew more and more convinced that the fairy tales and the beautiful legends, myths and stories of old Greece, of Hercules, Theseus, and also of the dragon-killer Siegfried, were not true. So it is natural that we mourn to see the most beautiful fairy tale of the world broken down. But there is some comfort. Fairy tales contain in the veil of fiction some ideal truth. So they are, though not real, yet true. And so Deity itself does not break down: it is merely our faculty, our capacity for comprehending the Deity, that fails. Not Mitra is God, the personification of the sun according to Persian religion, not Zeus, the Olympian of the Greeks. He merely symbolizes the sky, a humanized being of what was supposed to be the highest and best in nature. Moses taught Monotheism, but his Jehovah was only a name of the real God he preached. Allah il Allah! cried Mohammed, but his Allah was too much like himself to resemble the eternal Deity of the Universe. He was the ideal of the Arabic tribes, and they were unable to grasp any higher thing. Christ came, and the human race learned to call God their Father. Alas! again it is only a name, an allegory. It is expressive, however, and who denies the beauty and inmost truth of it? But there are always men who are not satisfied with what they possess of truth. They desire to penetrate farther into its depths, and some such theosophers perceived clearly that God is not a person. He encompasses all that is highest and best, he is all in all, he is the soul of the Universe. Such men were Tauler and Jacob Böhme. Then the philosopher steps forth

and shows the weakness of this ontology. Kant proves that this God is merely a noumenon, an empty concept. And therewith we are at an end with the development of the God idea. On the one hand, there is some truth in the idolatry of the heathens, in the fire worship of Zoroaster, in the creed of the Mohammedans. But on the other, there is some error also in the highest Christian theosophy, and the philosopher must not imagine that his carefully distilled ontology is really the quintessence of Deity. We can but say what God is not like; so unsearchable is He that the veriest atheism* appears to come nearest the truth.

* Kant's atheism is not at all as shallow as that of vulgar blasphemers or common freethinkers. His is that atheism of which Max Müller speaks in his distinction of the honest and the vulgar atheism, where he says: "There is an atheism which is unto death — there is another atheism which is the very life-blood of all true faith. It is the power of giving up what in our best, our most honest, moments we know no longer to be true. It is the readiness to replace the less perfect, however dear, however sacred it may have been to us, by the more perfect, however much it may be detested as yet by the world. It is the true self-surrender, the true self-sacrifice, the truest trust in truth, the truest faith. Without that atheism, religion would long ago have become a petrified hypocrisy. Without that atheism, no new religion, no reform, no reformation, no resuscitation would have ever been possible; without that atheism no new life is possible for any one of us. In the eyes of the Brahmins Buddha was an atheist. ... In the eyes of the Athenian judges Socrates was an atheist.... In the eyes of the Jews whosoever called himself the son of God was a blasphemer, and whosoever worshipped the God of his father after that new way was a heretic. The very name of the Christians among Greek and Romans was atheists (ἄθεοι).

"Nor did the abuse of language cease altogether among the Christians themselves. In the eyes of Athanasius, the Arians were devils, anthichrists, maniacs, Jews, polytheists, atheists. And we need not wonder if Arius did not take a much more charitable view of the Athanasians. Yet both Athanasius and Arius were only striving to realize the highest ideal of Deity, each in his own way; Arius fear-

There is no doubt that Kant was scientifically a real atheist; but, on the other hand, he establishes simply on the basis of our emotional wants the idea of God. Is it the same dogmatic God? Kant does not tell. And it is even astonishing, how little trouble,—in fact, none at all—he takes to justify this God before the tribunal of pure reason. Kant leaves it to us to find out how the radical atheism, and this practical—let us rather say emotional— theism can be combined into a unity. How is it possible that yes and no are consistent and compatible with each other, and how can sweet and bitter come from the same mouth? No! neither he who selects either of these Kantian souls, nor he who takes indiscriminately what he pleases, is a true successor and follower of Kant, but rather he who is able to reconcile the

ing that Gentile, Athanasius that Jewish errors might detract from its truth and majesty. Nay, even in later times the same thoughtlessness of expression has continued in the theological warface... In the XVIth century Servetus called Calvin a trinitarian and atheist, while Calvin considered Servetus worthy of the stake (1553) because his view of Deity differed from his own."

Max Müller when delivering this lecture, knew his audience, mixed as it was, too well, not to see the danger to which he exposed himself. So he added: "Now I know perfectly well, that what I have said just now will be misunderstood, will possibly be misinterpreted. I know I shall be accused of having defended and glorified atheism and of having represented it as the last, the highest point, which man can reach in an evolution of religious thought. Let it be so! If there are but a few here present who understand what I mean by honest atheism, and who know, how it differs from vulgar atheism, ay, from dishonest theism, I shall feel satified; for I know that to understand that distinction will often help us in the hour of our sorest need. It will teach us, that while the old leaves of the bright and happy spring are falling and all seems wintry, there must be a new spring in store for every warm and honest heart. It will teach us that honest doubt is the deepest spring of honest faith, and that he only who has lost can find."

contradiction of his philosophy. Kant's unmistakable dualism, however, is not due to a want of consistency, but to the fact that he is standing on the tribunal of justice and, being unable to decide, allows each party to say its mind.

God may be likened to the sea in its vastness and grandeur. The diver strikes down into its depth and the sailor swims on its surface. The one finds precious pearls and corals in its abysses; the other encompasses a cognizance of its extension, but declares it to be a stormy and sterile water-desert, wherein no precious things are to be found. The sailor is our pure reason and the diver our emotion. If the philosopher is not able to combine both, he will be either a shallow rationalist, keeping constantly on the surface, thus gathering his cognition superficially, or a thoughtless zealot, a prejudiced and one-sided bigot.

§ 5. TRUTH MEANS HARMONY OF VERITY WITH VERACITY.

Kant's philosophy is rigidly bold, and weak souls may consider it dangerous to have his doctrines taught at our universities. But truth is never dangerous and the earnest love of truth will never be detrimental. Truth is by no means the possession of some verity, acquired in some way or another, no matter how. Truth is the quality of being true. So it is the harmony of our subjective aspiration or love of truth,—of our veracity with the objective verity of the matter inquired into. Truth can not be stolen; and if it be taken by stealth, it is no longer real truth. It is some sad verity, which proves fatal to our intellectual and emotional life.

Very instructive is Schiller's pensive ballad of the veiled statue of Isis, in which the poet describes a youth who, aspiring to truth, enters one of the hierarchical schools at

Saïs. His ambition drives him from reach to reach as he presses upward from degree to degree, but he finds no satisfaction, for what is truth if communicated in single parts? Or could it be possible to be in possession of a fraction of truth?—While he is arguing on such subjects with his instructor, the hierophant—the ardent eye of the youth espies a shrouded statue standing in the temple. "What does this veil conceal?" he asks. "Truth itself," is the answer. "And you have never lifted it?" he continues. "Never," the priest rejoins, "nor have I ever been tempted to do so; for the veil may be light, but heavy is the divine law which forbids the uncovering." "And yet the oracle says: he who lifts the veil, shall see truth."

After this discussion the youth went out secretly in the hush of night. He entered the temple where the tall wan figure stood, on which through the skylight window, the moon poured down her silvery pallid light. Reluctantly he touched the veil, still hesitating to lift it. Yet his desire to see truth was too ardent. He could not resist the temptation and lifted the veil. Well—and what did he see? So we ask, and many asked the same question of him. But he never told what he had seen. A sad melancholy led him to premature death, and wherever he was requested to tell his secret, he replied: "Woe to them, who arrive at truth by the path of guilt. It will never be a comfort to them."

A man who acquires a grave and important truth not by hard study but by frivolous license will either be pressed down by the burden of such forbidden knowledge, —a knowledge for which he was not matured, which he could not endure, like that youth in Schiller's ballad—or, what is worse, he will make light of it, and become a blasphemer. And the reason of this is, he really does not own truth—for truth can only be owned if deservedly

earned. He has caught a glimpse of it, a one-sided look; and that being incomplete proves to be fatal. The other side containing the antidote for the poison of the first is hidden from his profane eyes.

How many of our clergymen are like the hierophant, who, bowing in silent reverence, was never tempted to penetrate into the depth of truth in order to unveil it? But, on the other hand, how few philosophers toil on, thinking and striving to get hold of truth from all sides, like Kant, who rather acquiesced in dualism than jumped at hasty conclusions?

§ 6. KANT'S ANTINOMIES.

The sincerity of Kant's dualism is best proved by his *antinomies* or contradictions of pure reason. He says: (according to Max Müller's translation, p. 352) "... when we apply reason to the objective synthesis of phenomena, ...reason tries at first with great plausibility to establish its principles of unconditioned unity, but becomes soon entangled in so many contradictions, that it must give up its pretensions... For here we are met by a new phenomenon in human reason, namely, a perfectly natural antithetic, which is not produced by any artificial efforts, but into which reason falls by itself and inevitably. Reason is, no doubt, preserved thereby from the slumber of an imaginary conviction, which is often produced by a purely one-sided illusion; but it is tempted at the same time, either to abandon itself to sceptical despair, or to assume a dogmatical obstinacy, taking its stand on certain assertions, without granting a hearing, and doing justice to the arguments of the opponents. In both cases a death-blow is dealt to sound philosophy, although in the former we might speak of the *euthanasia* of pure reason."

And further, Kant says (p. 364), "a dialectic proposition of pure reason must have these characteristics to distinguish it from purely sophistical propositions, that it does not refer to a gratuitous question, but to one which human reason in its natural progress must necessarily encounter," etc.

"As impartial judges, we must take no account of whether it be the good or the bad cause which the two champions defend."

And the antinomies are as follows:

1. *Thesis.* The world has a beginning in time and is limited also with regard to space.

1. *Antithesis.* The world has no beginning and no limits in space, but is infinite in respect both to time and space.

(It is the problem of creation as to whether there is a *first cause* or no.)

2. *Thesis.* Every compound substance in the world consists of simple parts, and nothing exists anywhere but the simple or what it is composed of.

2. *Antithesis.* No compound thing in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists nowhere in the world anything simple.

(This antinomy is quaintly expressed. To go at once to the bottom of what Kant proposes, the thesis declares the soul to be immortal, and the antithesis says human soul is a composition and therefore not immortal.)

3. *Thesis.* Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality from which all the phenomena of the world can be deduced. In order to account for these phenomena it is necessary also to admit another causality, that of freedom.

3. *Antithesis.* There is no freedom; but everything in the world takes place entirely according to the laws of nature.

4. *Thesis.* There exists an absolutely necessary Being belonging to the world, either as a part or as the cause of it.

4. *Antithesis.* There nowhere exists an absolutely necessary Being within or without the world as the cause of it.

§ 7. CONCLUSION.

As the discussion is limited strictly to Kant's dualism, which has been explained and proved, at least in its outlines, let us hasten to our conclusion. Kant, in spite of his atheism, felt that the *idea of God* contains a truth which no radicalism can blot out. And although he recognized that there is but one law ruling the affairs of this world, viz., causality, implying necessity to everything, without exception, yet he was conscious of that *freedom of will*, which is the inmost spring of all our actions. The old orthodox and dogmatic views, which in some respect received their death-blow from the hands of Kant, were not simply nonsensical ideas, which we must get rid of as soon as possible. There is wheat among the tares, and so we must be careful in eliminating, lest both be destroyed, the good as well as the evil. Let us rather sift the radical as well as the dogmatical ideas, and put their arguments to a severe test. Only in this way will the discord of that dualism be dissolved into the harmony and unison of a monism, which may be the basis for a further development of the human mind with regard to religious as well as philosophical ideas.

The following articles try to realize this ideal, and will prove, let us hope, that there is more unity in the general plan of human reason than Kant supposed. Our *monism* results in a contemplation of the world by which so many seemingly contradictory truths are recon-

ciled with each other: the ideal on the one side, with the real on the other, logical deduction with empirical induction, religious faith with philosophic and scientific inquiry, the inflexible causality with a higher teleology, and the rigid law of necessity with freedom of will and morality.

CAUSALITY.

§ 1. HUME'S PROBLEM.

THE hero of the struggle concerning the question of causality is David Hume. He is the hero, but not the conqueror, of that problem. On the contrary, he was defeated and laid down his arms, unable to carry on the strife. His merit, however, remains, for he was the first to boldly attack the huge array of philosophic problems in the very centre at headquarters; and he carried the brunt of the battle to that point where alone the decision can be expected.

Causality is the keystone of all philosophic difficulty, and all other problems depend upon the solution of this query. God is called the first cause, creation is a problem of causation, the basis of science is the law of cause and effect, and cognition is tracing an effect back to the causes which are supposed to have produced it. There is no problem in the empire of the human mind, which is not more or less connected with causality.

In former centuries causality was considered an *aeterna veritas*, an eternal truth, which needed not to be proved. David Hume was the first to enquire into this law and to demand its legitimation. However, as he could not find any other argument than that found in experience, as there was no other test than its constant repetition in nature, he considered that it was not susceptible of proof and turned sceptic.

Now this acute Scotch critic, though he wrote in language not at all obscure, as philosophers are too often prone to do, but in plain strong English, which

can be understood by almost any one, was unfortunate enough to be at first neglected and afterwards to be misunderstood by his contemporaries. His first and most valuable essay, published in 1738, remained unnoticed and unheeded, and not till he had drawn the attention of his countrymen to himself by some essays on history, political economy, etc., did he venture to lay before the public anew his neglected philosophy in a weakened and crippled edition. Now, at least, he succeeded in rousing the opposition of his contemporaries. None, however, understood what Hume intended to propose, and what was really the end he aimed at. Being an adherent of Locke, he rejected innate ideas, and in consequence he said that all ideas are produced by the impressions of objects, outside of ourselves, or, in other words, merely by experience. Consistently with this doctrine, he considered the law of cause and effect to be empirical. This would exclude its absolute currency and render it of mere transitory value, just effective and valid for this or that single case; but we are not at all assured that it will be binding in other cases. It is a bold assumption to take it for granted and rely upon it as on an eternal truth, for it can not be proved by argument.

Hume says on this subject: "Yet so imperfect are the ideas concerning it (*viz.* causality) that it is impossible to give any just definition of cause, except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it. Similar objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have experience. Suitably to the experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object followed by an other, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in other words, where, if the first had not been, the second never had existed." I can not dwell long here on the many

mistakes Hume commits, but let me hint that cause and effect are *not objects*, but two *events*, one following the other. According to Hume, every carriage of a railroad train would be the effect of the one going before, which, *vice versa*, would be the cause of the following one; for they are indisputably *similar objects, one followed by another.*

Hume acknowledges the law of identity (a = a), but cause and effect are by no means identical; nay, he says, they are entirely different and form a *synthesis, i.e.*, composition of two things; *ergo* causality, he concludes, can not be proved. All connections which we observe, the changes of which we call cause and effect, are so many single cases, and it is perhaps quite incidental, if they are equal in their repetition. There is, according to Hume, no necessary connection in this world and if it really existed, there is no reason whatever why we should rely upon it so long as we can not demonstrate it. So all science, especially natural science, resting on experience, lacks a solid basis, after the validity of causality is denied. Exactness of investigation is impossible, because it is left to chance, and the trustful inquirer into the secrets of nature is baffled, since he gropes in the dark, now that science has lost the condition on which it stands.

Hume's adversaries supposed that the philosopher denied the existence of causality itself and endeavored to demonstrate its operation to him. Their attacks do not affect him, as he by no means denied causality but merely doubted its foundation. With this, however, the universality of the law is lost, and all the affairs of the world, instead of being one uninterrupted chain of causes and effects are dissolved into unaccountable and innumerable particularities.* The universe in such a case is no

* Mr. John Stuart Mill takes the same ground. He says in his System of Deductive and Inductive Logic, Book III, Chapter IV, § 1:

longer a unity but an agglomeration of single things, here and there connected by chance, but not by necessity, since the law of causality, that universal tie by which the cosmos is bound together, can no longer be accepted as *aeterna veritas.*

The same punctilious sceptic, however, who refused to acknowledge the universal validity of the highest law in nature, distinguished between *demonstrative* and so-called *rational* truths, the latter being the axioms of arithmetic and mathematics. Hume accepted them without hesitation and did not in the least suspect their certainty. At no time did he stop to enquire into their legitimacy and origin. And to Kant belongs the merit of having pointed out their relation and affinity to causality. Thus

"In the contemplation of that uniformity in the course of nature, which is assumed in every inference from experience, one of the first observations that present themselves is, that the uniformity in question is not properly *uniformity*, but *uniformities*. The general regularity results from the co-existence of partial regularities. The course of nature in general is constant, because the course of each of the various phenomena that compose it, is so."

In accordance with this, necessity does not exist at all, and Mill, indeed, draws this conclusion. He says: "When, therefore, it is affirmed, that the conclusions of geometry are necessary truths, the necessity consists in reality only in this, that they correctly follow from the suppositions from which they are deduced. Those suppositions are so far from being necessary, that they are not even true; they purposely depart more or less widely from the truth" (*they depart from experience, however, not from truth*). "The only sense in which necessity can be ascribed to the conclusions of any scientific investigation, is that of legitimately following from some assumption, which by the conditions of the inquiry is not to be questioned."— True, logical legitimacy is what ought to be necessary, and in most cases will certainly prove to be so. Yet the two terms are, by no means, identical; nor could the idea of necessity be thus eliminated. In consistency with the negation of necessity, Mill ought to have declared himself a sceptic, as Hume, in accordance with the principles from which both started, really did.

he was able to appreciate the importance of Hume's scepticism and at the same time to lead the way to a solution of the problem. He generalized Hume's question as to causality, and investigated the whole ground of so-called *rational* thought and knowledge. He found out that we are indeed in possession of some truths which are entirely independent of experience and are even the condition of experience. Such truths independent of, and antecedent to, experience were called *a priori*, and, so far as they are the conditions of experience, Kant terms the same *transcendental*, (a word carefully to be distinguished from *transcendent*, the latter designating a transmundane existence). *Transcendental* Kant calls the rational or *a priori* axioms and theorems as passing over to the *a posteriori*, and forming fundamental rules for our experience. These truths, *a priori*, are in the first instance the mathematical, arithmetical, and logical theorems. $2 \times 2 = 4$ is an axiom which we know before all experience and which, we are sure, is a universal law, —a law *necessary* under any condition and as such *universal.* Necessity and universality are to Kant sure indications of the apriority of a truth. As both are applicable to causality, it is undoubtedly a law *a priori;* and as it is the condition of all experience it is *transcendental.*

§ 2. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COGNIZANCE.

In doubting causality Hume ought to have doubted all other *a priori* truths as well. Then, any cognizance would have been disputable, any observation illusory, every judgment fallacious and science without value. In such a case we must not be astonished if spiritists merely smile at the most exact deductions and conclusions of our scientific men. The apriority of our rational sciences, to be sure,

is the condition of knowledge, — that is, to speak in Kant's nomenclature, it is *transcendental.*

From a particular sensation, according to the law of causality, which beforehand or *a priori* we take for granted, we conclude that it is the effect of some cause outside of ourselves. And in this way causality becomes the organ or instrument of cognition. Here more than any where else the importance of the doctrine of apriority is shown. Mere experience would be for ever condemned to crawl on the soil and stick to single and particular facts. Apriority, by affording necessity and universality, lends us the wings of generalization and makes a universal law of seemingly incidental and fortuitous cases.

It should be observed, however, as apriority has been so often misinterpreted, that it does not mean at all such knowledge as is antecedent in the temporal sense but simply prior as the condition of empirical or *a posteriori* cognizance. Adversaries of Kant's transcendental philosophy fight against wind-mills if they attempt to prove that mathematical truths are not innate ideas which we may be conscious of from our birth, but that on the contrary, they must be acquired with the same or even greater difficulty than empiric knowledge. No one doubts that, neither Kant nor any transcendental philosopher. But *a priori* and *a posteriori* truths are different in regard to their origin, the latter being produced from experience by our sensation ; the former, however, being rational, grow within ourselves, and stand merely on pure reason. We acquire them by meditation ; and such truths once stated can not be shaken by any experience ; while contrariwise any empiric knowledge may be proved erroneous as soon as a new experience demands new explanations of former experiences. $2 \times 2 = 4$ is true not only on this planet of ours, but also on the farthest star in the skies. Empirical knowledge can not boast of such universality,

and wherever it attains it, it is done through rational truths, by generalization on ground of *a priori* theorems.

The distinction between these diametrically different kinds of knowledge must be preserved. It must be confessed, however, that the nomenclature, as used by Kant, is not at all adequate. Instead of *a priori* and *a posteriori*, we propose to use the terms *internal* and *external*. Internal knowledge is the rational, growing from pure reason within ourselves, and the instrument of all empirical knowledge, or what Kant styles *a priori* and transcendental. Herbert Spencer characterizes it as the "inconceivability of the contrary." It is that knowledge which cannot be otherwise, which we take for granted beforehand, which we acquire by pure meditation without any help from experience, (though experience may illustrate and explain it by examples,) and which we believe even though experience should seem to contradict it. External knowledge is drawn from exterior sources by means of sensation. Truths of the first kind are by their very nature universal and necessary, those of the other are particular, incidental and fortuitous. Sciences treating of rational truths are also called *formal*, on account of their subjects being merely formal. Natural sciences inquire into substantial things ; and in regard to this fact, Kant correctly states, that experience "without the help of apriority is *blind*," but that the purely *a priori* statements are *empty*, *viz.:* mere formal truths. So they generalize, systematize and render clear our experience, but are unable to enlarge it.

Should we meet in our experience with a case contradictory to *a priori* truths or apparently annihilating the universality of their axioms, especially the validity of the causal law, we suppose beforehand that we are mistaken in our observations, that there is at the bottom, some error, illusion or even deception. We try anything before

we acquiesce in such a contradiction of what we consider irrefutable; and such a case is exactly what we call the impossible.

An adherent of Auguste Comte, who denied the doctrine of apriority and declared that all truths are gained from experience by sensation, or *a posteriori*, being asked if he would have confidence in a careful observation, though it might appear to be in contradiction to mathematical or arithmetical truths, for instance, that 2 x 2 are equal to 5, answered in involuntary haste: "That could never happen!" This reply, though it slipped from his tongue unawares, is a proof that he believed unconsciously in the apriority of rational knowledge. For the axiom $2 \times 2 = 4$ is distinguished from the most complicated theorem *a priori*, not essentially, but merely by its simplicity.

There is a certain puzzle in which a square, consisting of 8 x 8 smaller squares, is cut and composed anew into a rectangle of 5 x 13 or 65 squares of the same size as the 64 had been. In the first moment the illusion is perfect. Clever deception will add a sophism which covers the fallacy of the argument. A thinking person, however, will declare from the very beginning that there is some deception, for he knows *a priori* that a plane cannot be increased by a mere alteration of its form.

The empirical cognition of experience carries together our observations one by one in such a way that all our knowledge must for ever remain fragmentary piecework. And it is natural that such should be *external* cognizance. *Internal* cognizance contrariwise comprehends its truths in their unity; therefore the laws *a priori* are always complete, and what is proved mathematically will ever be beyond doubt.

§ 3. CAUSALITY A LAW OF MOTION.

Now causality is no doubt an internal truth, and may be proved as well as any mathematical theorem. Let me mention, however, that rightly considered, mathematical truths are not proved. All arguments of this science are reductions from the complicated to the simpler and thence to the self-evident. The latter, however, is never proved, but accepted on credit under the name of *axiom*. It may now be shown that, in spite of Hume, causality, like any *a priori* theorem, may be traced to the most simple axiom, and that is the axiom of identity.

Cause is an event in some state of things, which necessarily leads to a change. If you take from a heap of stones one of the undermost, all those resting upon it will rush after and in some way alter their position. There is no other alteration than that which is caused by motion. Everything, save the arrangement, remains the same after as before the change. But there was an occurrence which disturbed the equilibrium of the whole state of things; and to restore it, a motion of the disturbed parts became necessary. The disturbance of the equilibrium is the cause, its restoration the effect. A spark thrown into powder results in an explosion. The spark is not the cause, but its being thrown into the powder, its approach to the inflammable material. The effect is the change in the composition of the powder. Nor, in the first instance, is the stone the cause, but its removal, *i. e.*, the act of its being taken away. Causes as well as effects are always some events, occurrences, incidents, which happen. They are never things or objects, which exist. And so the term means an alteration in some state of circumstances, a change of situation, position, posture, or a replacement and new ar-

rangement of some conjuncture. In one word, *causality is a law of motion.* One alteration in some state of things produces another; thus effect is a change in consequence of another prior change. Matter, however, as we know from the law of preservation of force and matter, remains unaltered and unchanged. After the explosion all the single atoms of the powder are still in existence, though in an entirely different composition. But, apart from this difference of the combination of atoms, matter is the same before and after the explosion. It remains identical in the change, and we may call causality the *identity in change.*

In every case the transformation worked by causality is an alteration effected by movement. The single atoms of matter remain unchanged, but they have often undergone a *metastasis* in their combination. For instance, if water boils, it evaporates, and seems to disappear; but no! The gaseous hydrogen, though invisible to our eyes, hovers in the air. Not a drop is lost after the transformation into the gaseous state of aggregation. We know it *a priori;* and all this is confirmed and corroborated by experience. But if we did not know it from internal meditation, how could we state such a law so assuredly and emphatically as being universal and without any exception? It is merely because we comprehend the truths of internal cognition in their totality and completeness. True, experience endorses it in single instances. But that is merely the countersign, to support, to second and uphold it. The warrant is given by pure reason independent of experience, which explains it by examples, thus testifying to and ratifying a law, which can not be otherwise and is self-evident exactly as $2 \times 2 = 4$.

§ 4. CAUSE AND EFFECT DOES NOT MERELY MEAN A SUCCESSION.

The mark of difference, which distinguishes the erudite from the illiterate man, is the acknowledgment of the apriority, and, so far as the lack of this influences the latter, we call him superstitious. Let causality be merely empirical, let it be a law, not as we have derived it like a law of pure mathematics, logic, or mechanics by deduction, but by induction, and we could never be sure of its necessity or universality, and any superstition would be admissible with the same legitimacy as science. We would not be entitled to refuse any pretended experience, not even of the most absurd events. If, as Hume thinks, and as John Stuart Mill states, cause and effect are a mere following, not an ensuing, then, indeed, the theory of the excellence of wine, grown in comet years, would be proved as scientifically as anything could be, for experience is in favor of it. But it is such an experience as proves nothing, because we observe a succession, not a connection, and not a whit of causal concatenation. Reid is quite right in saying (though John Stuart Mill tries to escape the consequence in longwinded explanations) that, according to the principle of the positivist school, night would be the effect of day, as we observe their constant succession.

If science could not penetrate deeper into the connection of phenomena than by stating their succession, there would not properly exist any such science as that which has for its object the enquiry into causal connection and the establishment of laws, in conformity with which single events must occur thus and not otherwise. And if we were not sure of causality beforehand by merely internal insight, if it were not *a priori*, we should not be astonished at finding cases in which causality does not work, where its

operation is suspended, or where there rules an other arrangement: for instance, such a kind of preter- or supernatural causality, as is supposed to exist in astrology and alchemy. Therefore, the necromancer and thaumaturgist quote and appeal to Shakespeare's dictum :

> There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
> Than are dreamed of in our philosophy.

Certainly there are many things which we have not explored as yet and, moreover, there are some that by their very nature are unsearchable, but there are none in contradiction with reason. Whenever there appears to be such a contradiction, there is some delusion either arising from our error or from the fraud and deceit of others.

When a person really commences to doubt whether causality be not suspended in a certain case, even in indifferent matters, he is overcome unawares and becomes possessed, as it were, with a certain demoniac uneasiness. The more highly organized animals do the same ; horses tremble, and dogs whine if events happen, (for instance, eclipses of the sun,) which they can not account for. The superstitious take them as marvels and prodigies worked by some supernatural power. The erudite man alone is not overawed in such cases. He thinks and ruminates, nor is he satisfied until he has found the causal connection which in the most unaccountable facts he supposes ever to exist.

So we have arrived at a fair explanation of causality ; it is a law of motion. Cause is no object but some alteration in a state of things by which another alteration is effected. Nor is effect an object ; it is simply the new state of things as produced by the cause. So neither can the watchmaker be called a cause nor the watch an effect. His *work* is rather the cause and the proper *composition* of wheels, dial and hands the effect.

Causality changes; it may combine or dissolve, yet it never creates or destroys matter, the atoms and forces of which remain the same throughout the infinite concatenation of causes and effects.

§ 5. KANT'S IDEALISM.

Before we venture on the more intricate difficulties of causality, we must dwell for a space on a seeming subtlety, which is, however, of great consequence. For there remains to be explained the relation of the internal truths to the external world. This relation being the bridge between the subject and the object, between thinking and existing, between the mind and the universe, is the basis, whereon our conception of the world rests. The internal truths are held to be valid *a priori*, because they are necessary and universal. Now, passing the bridge from the subjective *a priori* side of the interior of our soul to the exterior environment in the world abroad, we find there those same truths corroborated *a posteriori;* for the highest universal laws of experience are exactly the same as those of pure reason. And the planets wander on their ways through the heavens in such ellipses as we may construct in pure mathematics. Causality in the same way is valid as far as ever our experience extends and never have any theorems of arithmetic and mathematics been proved by experience to be erroneous. Thus by experience we become acquainted a second time and *a posteriori* with the rational truths, which we learned *a priori.* And while sensation introduces us into the material contents of the world, these general laws afford an insight into the mere form of the world, *viz.*, time and space.

Now there arises this question: these formal laws in nature around us being identical with those internal laws within us, where lies their source, and on which side are

they original, and on which have they been borrowed? And if they are borrowed on either, how arises this wondrous harmony?

Kant, in his Prolegomena § 36, faces this difficulty and puts the question as follows: "How is nature itself possible?" And he ratiocinates: "The highest laws of nature (*viz.*, in the exterior of the world outside of and around us) are found independent of all experience within ourselves *a priori*." Astonished at this congruency, he asks: "How arises this congruency?" And he imagines that there are only two possibilities. "Either," he says, "we borrow the rational truths from nature, that means, we receive them by experience,—or they are transferred from us to nature." The first solution is that of Locke; after him David Hume and the positivists of the present day have taken the same ground. Such a solution, however, is impossible, as Kant has irrefutably proved the apriority of time and space. As they are independent of any experience they *can not* be borrowed from the exterior world. Therefore Kant says: "There is left but the other solution, which is the reverse of Locke's: 'Our reason dictates its laws to nature,' *i.e.*, our reason is instituted or organized in such a way that it can not perceive the world otherwise than in the shape of time and space, and connected by causality as well as by the apparatus of apriority. Whether the world is so or no we know not; it appears to us so, and we can not help seeing the world in the frame of time, space, and causality. But it is our mind that frames it thus; the frame does not belong to the picture, though we are not able to take it out and handle it as it really is."

This is what Kant calls his *idealism*. The ratiocination, however, on which it rests, contains a fallacy which led him astray. He erroneously held *a priori* identical with subjective, *i.e.*, belonging to and inherent in the *ego;*

and all truths *a priori* were in this way supposed to be subjective. Now they are so indeed, in some respects, inasmuch as they grow internally within the *ego*. And experiencing their objectivity in the world outside of us, Kant argues that there must needs be a loan, given by our *ego* to the world. Locke's solution is certainly wrong, as the apriority of time and space is undeniable. So Kant sees no other way than that which constitutes his idealism, according to which time and space and the whole world as we perceive it are not real but ideal, our mind dictating the fundamental laws.

§ 6. THE FOUNDATION OF MONISM.

But is there no other possible way out of the difficulty? There is a third way to a solution; it is midway between Locke and Kant, overlooked by Kant, and the only remaining way. Let us try it and hope that it will lead to a more satisfactory result.

First let us ask, what is the subject in the objective world? What are we ourselves in regard to our surroundings? If we were standing outside of ourselves, inquiring into what we call our subject, our *ego*, the centre of our cognition, we should find it to be an object like all other objects beside it.

How now, with regard to our problem? Are not the *internal truths* inherent and *a priori* to all subjects which swarm around us as objects; and should we not suppose, therefore, that they belong rather to our objective existence? Every *ego* in this world (as it must needs have—or rather must be—an objective existence) finds the internal truths in this objective existence, *i.e.*, within itself, in such a way as to be able to construct them *a priori*. In consequence of this, everything existing exists materially and must, of necessity, partake of the

form of the world, *viz.*, time and space. Thus the formal laws of nature are valid in the same. As it is extended, it partakes of space; it moves, and a state antecedent and consequent gives the difference of time; it changes according to, and is conditioned by, causality. And such being the laws of objective existence, they adhere to any object permeating its entire essence so that any object, if developed to the state of consciousness, will find these laws by mere reflection and meditation, as they are part of ourselves, *viz.*, the formal part of our existence.

This answer to the problem of apriority is very simple. It also affords information concerning *the origin* of these internal truths, a query which Kant nowhere proposed, and never answered. And moreover, it justifies our assumption of internal truths as granted. Their universality and necessity rest *de facto* on the idea that the form of nature (pure space) is everywhere the same; every thing that exists partakes of it, and is subject to, and conditioned by, its laws. Thus we know that the laws of pure space, as we recognize them within us, are the same in our existence as anywhere else. For space is space anywhere and everywhere; it is the mere form of material existence.

This solution of Hume's problem will be recognized by-and-by as the only possible and true one. It affords a basis for science which Hume despaired of finding and which neither Locke, Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill on the one side, nor Kant and the transcendental philosophers on the other, can give. It fills the gap between subject and object, between spirit and matter; it reconciles idealism and realism, explains the connection of the *a priori* with the *a posteriori*, thus restoring harmony in the universe between the *ego* and the cosmos, and scientifically establishes a conception of the world which we comprise under the name of *Monism*.

FIRST CAUSE AND FINAL CAUSE.

§ 1. THE ANTINOMY OF FIRST CAUSE.

Causality is the law of cause and effect, and nothing else. There is, however, such a confusion about the idea of cause, that we must be particularly careful; and in no language is the misuse and inadequacy of words greater than in English. Cause as well as effect is an event, or fact; the cause is past, if the effect has ensued. Both are temporal, as they designate merely a state of affairs. So, as was stated above, cause is never a thing; much less can a person be called a cause. I may cause some effect by some action, I may produce some result by my labor, and my person may be accessory to some event, even through its mere presence, but I myself am never a cause.

The mistake is magnified, if God is called the *first cause*. First causes are of mere relative existence. They are the starting points of a series of some longer chain of causes and effects. According to La Place, the cause of the rotation in that gaseous nebula, from which our planets have been developed, was the unequal partition of matter. So it was the first cause in the formation of the solar system, which happened so many millions of years ago. It has passed as any cause passes that is merely some temporal event.

We reject and condemn, therefore, the idea of a first cause in the sense of Creator, as a contradiction in itself. And those who call God the first cause have either a vague idea of what they mean, or they intend to say that God is the *final principle* of the world, *the most general*

law, governing the whole universe, the fundamental basis, and, so to speak, the *ground* on which everything rests, from which all existences spring and originate, and the *ultimate reason* to which we trace the existence of the cosmos. Such a principle, or whatever other name you may be pleased to give it, is not a passing cause, which happens once and exists no longer, but a living presence, which pervades the whole world, and is the operating force in all causes and the causation in causality.

After what we have stated here, thesis as well as antithesis in Kant's fourth antinomy about an absolutely necessary Being are right, though for the sake of clearness we must express this opposition in other words. The thesis declares: *there is an absolutely necessary final principle of this world;* though, according to the antithesis, *there does not exist a first cause.*

§ 2. THE KNOWABLE AND UNKNOWABLE.

It is this final principle which constitutes the philosophical idea of a God to the theist, which gives to the philosopher the basis of what is called metaphysics, and which an atheist like Herbert Spencer calls the "unknowable." It is the enigma of the world which by its very nature can not be comprehended.

It may be hinted here that, with the exception of Kant, philosophers have hitherto been accustomed to speak dogmatically about the metaphysical province of thought. So Herbert Spencer begins his philosophy with the statement of the unknowable, without even trying to justify its supposition. The positivists simply ignore it, a method easier even than that of Spencer, though one which by no means relieves us of the difficulty.

Before we venture on *metaphysics*, let us know what *physics* is, and before we make statements about the

unknowable, let us define what is *knowable;* especially let us have a clear conception as to what is the process, by which that cognizance is attained. If that is understood, I trust, that from the nature of cognition itself we may find the limit at which our knowledge comes to a stand and where the province of the unknowable commences.

§ 3. THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF COGNITION.

Cognition means the tracing of causality or the search for that law, according to which *matter moves in space.* Matter, space and movement we call therefore the *principles of cognition.* (1) Space is the source of our internal, (2) matter of our external knowledge, and (3) in motion we have a combination of both. By means of these three principles we are able to comprehend anything in the world—yes, anything, except the world itself, and so really nothing. The eye may see anything except itself; it sees all objects around it, but it cannot see its own seeing.

These principles of cognition, simple and plain as they seem at first sight, are by their very nature incomprehensible. 1. *Space*, which we recognize intuitively and grasp internally, the laws of which are self-evident and *a priori*, which we fancy we understand so thoroughly, simply by being in the interior of it, and comprising all its regularity in most accurately formulated mathematical theorems—this same space is entirely incomprehensible in its totality. We call it infinite, a negative term, which merely signifies our inability to grasp it in its unity.

2. Our cognition of *matter* moves in an exactly contrary direction. We know matter from its outside; we observe how it acts, but are not admitted to its interior. What matter really is, we shall never know, though we may analyze it and comprehend all its properties. To

external knowledge it seems so intelligible, lucid and natural; its existence is simply a fact. Yet we are not able to grasp its inwardness, and Faust's desire:

> That I may detect the inmost force
> Which binds the world and guides its course,
> Its germs, productive powers, explore
> And rummage in empty words no more—

can never be fulfilled.

3. *Movement* is a fact, but we cannot account for it. The whole universe is in constant motion. In each individual case we recognize a cause, which, being itself motion, produces another motion. We do our best to explain each single case by establishing some natural law; and this law, together with other and kindred laws, will find its reason in some higher or more general law, and so on up to the highest universal reason, which should comprise and account for all others. But this universal law operating in all individual cases, the final causation in causality, the last principle, the ground and reason of movement, is withdrawn from our comprehension, for it would be absurd to look for a more general reason of the last and universal reason. Here we arrive at the natural limit of our reasoning power. And so we are kept outside and not admitted into the Holy of Holies. The *sanctum sanctissimum* of cognition is locked for ever.

§ 4. THE TREBLE ENIGMA OF THE WORLD.

Thus all objects in the world are comprehensible by the principles of cognition, *viz.*, by space, matter, movement; as cognizance is nothing else than tracing how matter moves in space. Yet these principles of cognition themselves are incomprehensible, and so the enigma of the world is threefold: The problem of space is its *infinitude*, that of matter its *eternity*, that of movement the ground or last *causation of movement*.

§ 5. FINAL CAUSE AND EFFICIENT CAUSE.

The confusion which generally prevailed and still prevails, has produced another odd idea expressed by a word even more odd than first cause, *viz.: causa finalis* or *final cause*, in opposition to *causa efficiens*, or *efficient cause*, the latter meaning the usual causes as they operate according to the inexorable law of necessity, and the former meaning some other kind of cause, arranged by some conscious being for effecting some certain result, some *finis* or end, which we commonly call purpose. Purpose is the intended effect.

The term *final cause* has been invented on the supposition, that there exist two kinds of causality, the one regulated by chance, the other by some conscious will. On this field, the two parties, the dogmatists on the one hand, and the radicals on the other, clash with each other in fierce conflict. Here the struggle has been even more intense than anywhere else, (though Kant did not receive it into his antinomies,) for here the nerve of the questions lies. The dogmatist says: "*There is some transmundane power that has arranged the world to accomplish some ends or purposes*," (the Greek word is τέλος, from which such a contemplation of the world is called *teleology*) "*otherwise*," they argue, "*the universe would be a chaos, but no cosmos.*" The radicals, however, assert, that *there is no such thing as a transmundane existence, nor an arrangement like final causality.*

This time, however, the combatants arrange themselves somewhat differently. Kant unquestionably joins the negative, and Schopenhauer is found siding with the theologians; though he does not believe in a God, his transcendent *Will* is, according to his theory, the Creator of the world, not much different from a God.

§ 6. THE IDEA OF A FINIS IN CAUSATION.

We must be brief and therefore state beforehand that we can not accept two essentially different kinds of causality and that the expression *final cause* leads to confused and erroneous views. It is, at best, a very unfortunate expression. But here, as often happens, a grain of truth is in the chaff, and in some degree both parties are right. The word *final cause*, to be sure, must be blotted out, and I propose to use in its stead simply *finis*—answering to the Greek τέλος, and designating what Germans call *Zweck* and *Ziel*.

The idea of a *finis* is indispensable in the explanation of causality; and, as it is of practical import, we can not omit it in our investigation. Causality, as we have learned, is a law of movement. If there occurs any cause, some motion ensues. For instance: the storm tears a tile from a roof and carries it in the direction of the blast. In this case, the *finis* or, so to say, intended end of such a cause, lies in the direction which the hurricane takes. The tile, however, as soon as it has lost its place on the roof, has a tendency to fall straight to the ground according to the law of gravitation. Its *finis* or intended end would be towards the centre of the earth. Neither of these two *fines*, however, is carried into effect, for the stone will take the way of some parabola or hyperbola, resulting from the two directions of these different *fines*.

Every line of motion has its *whence* and its *whither*. The whence is the *cause*, the whither the *finis*. Sometimes, though certainly very seldom, the point of motion moves exactly in the straight line in which its *finis* lies. In such a case the *finis* will be identical with the real effect. There is but one uninfluenced, unchanged direction. The cause (C) drawn from the starting point to the *finis* (F) meets in a straight line, the actual result or effect

(E). But in a circular motion, C is a point on the cirumference, F lies in the direction of the tangents, and E in the curve of the circle. The motion of the earth has its *finis* constantly in the tangent of its elliptic path. But as it gravitates toward the sun, this tendency is never carried into effect; and the actual result is the *diagonal between the two forces*, justly called the *resultant*, forming in this case the curve of an ellipse.

And in the same way man's actions have a certain aim and purpose, which need not necessarily be identical with the result of his actions. But considering their ethical appreciation, we take care to judge not according to the result, but with reference to this *finis*, purpose or aim, which man tends toward or aspires to. For in reality this and nothing else shows his character, as it accounts for the motives by which he allows himself to be influenced, and thus the actions of man not as they are, but as they are intended to be, reveal his inmost nature.

All actions of a man, different as they may be, will be of a certain type, congenial to his character, because his character is the ground from which all his motives start. And this remaining to a certain extent the same throughout his life, all he does, says and intends, will be in unfailing harmony. His virtues and his vices will bear some resemblance and correspond; and moreover, they will show their common origin.

In the same way matter under certain circumstances will show certain qualities. So sulphur shines in the dark, it is inflammable, it melts in a heat of so many degrees, such and such is its specific weight, etc., etc.; and all these properties form single characteristics of this element, which in its unity we call sulphur. But in order to find out its nature, we must put it to different tests, called experiments, and by such experiments we find out how it operates under different circumstances.

The character of man and the properties of elements are inquired into in such a way, according to the law of causation, and whosoever would get at the truth, at what the last principles of the universe may be, must look for the ends and aims to which its development tends. And it is only this *finis* in the arrangement of the world that can give us some light upon the last principle of the cosmos.

§ 7. FINIS AND EVOLUTION.

There is no denying that there is such a *finis* in the universe as we have described, though it does not by any means prove to be the teleology of the dogmatist. We think that Dr. McCosh in his "Energy, Efficient and Final Cause" is entirely mistaken where he says on page 43: "In the cereals there is . . . a final cause in the food provided for the nourishment of man and living creatures." The *finis* in the growth of plants, no doubt, is to produce seed of their own kind for the perpetuation and propagation of their species. That such seed in most instances serves the purposes of man as food, is of great consequence to man, but quite accidental, and has nothing to do with the *finis* of the growth of plants.

We find a *finis* wherever we observe causation. Everywhere in the world therefore we meet with some development; it is found in history as well as in natural science. Hegel pointed it out for the first time, and though his theory was exaggerated by himself and his disciples in such a way that the historians of his school rather constructed history than inquired into it, yet the merit due to him cannot be denied. The history of mankind is not, as Schopenhauer says, a vague dream of humanity, but a well-developed evolution of the human idea. The same work in the more exact inquiries of natural sciences, based

on experiments and observations, has been done by Darwin; and Herbert Spencer's philosophy may justly be called the *philosophy of evolution.* The systematic application and generalization of this idea is his chief merit and most worthy claim to originality of thought.

§ 8. MORALITY THE ONLY MEANS BY WHICH EVOLUTION IS POSSIBLE.

It is undoubtedly a fact that the development of the world tends toward a higher plane and a better arrangement. Matter itself in its elements we know from the law of *conservation of force and matter* remains the same unchanged; we suppose them to be unalterable, and they are to-day as they have been millions and millions of years ago—yea from eternity. But the composition of matter is changeable; the arrangment in which the elements are combined, may be more or less favorable. And this arrangement undergoes a constant alteration according to the law of causality. And there is a tendency of advancement observable toward one and the same point: and this aim is the amelioration of the present state. Such an improvement is only possible by an unceasing struggle, by heroic work, not in the service of egotism, but in that of a higher unity, not by indulging in the happiness of the present, but by severe labor, done in and with the hope of a better future,—in one word, it is merely possible by *sacrifice.* So the single individual has to sacrifice his youth's best years for the comfort of his age, and in like manner humanity sacrifices the labor and lives of its individuals for a better future. Thus on the way of perpetual sacrifice the human race throngs onward to a higher and better existence and so does the whole universe.

And if similar races, as humanity on earth, live on

other planets, we may be fully convinced that there is also an evolution to constantly higher standpoints, for that is the *finis* whither the cosmical development tends. However, the way by which it advances and the means through which it attains this end is the principle of *morality*. It is a fact that single units serve as parts in a higher unity; like organs which operate in an organism, they work, they suffer, they sacrifice themselves for the good of the whole of which they form limbs. And the act of serving this higher interest, even with neglect of personal desires, is what we call morality.

§ 9. THE FINIS OF EVOLUTION INFORMS AS TO THE CHARACTER OF THE FINAL PRINCIPLE.

Only by knowing the *finis*, the *whither* of the development of the world, can we find out the nature and *character* of the final principle of the cosmos, which represents the *whence* of all movement in the universe, the ultimate ground and source from which all activity starts. Now, if the tendency of amelioration prevails everywhere, we should apply this law to the final principle, which pervades the macrocosm. So the aspiration towards ever higher aims on the high road of infinitude and eternity seems to be the inmost, the sublimest and grandest characteristic of this final interior of nature, the groundwork of the world. And if this solar system in which we live falls to pieces, after its due time, there are other suns with their planets which will have developed meanwhile, in which, no doubt, the same principle is as active as it is in this world of ours.

As we have seen on earth organisms rising into existence, developing, striving, to make straight the path to some higher state and then dying away in order to make room for organisms of higher rank, may there not be a

chance also for a similar evolution from less developed worlds to more highly organized solar systems, in a way of which we have not, and can not have, any experience? But such an idea, we must confess, belongs to the empire of dreamland, and so we merely hint at it, as we are not inclined here to indulge in suppositions and possibilities.

However this may be, *sursum* is at any rate the watch-word of all evolution and the *finis* everywhere perceptible. The means by which it is attained is morality; the source from which it starts is the wonderful spring that marvelously and mysteriously sets in motion the whole universe.

So we have learned that *first cause* and *final cause* are confusions; yet gleaning the truth from these ideas, we state that there is some *finis* in the world, which teaches us what we may know concerning the nature and *ultimate principle* of the universe, as the *finis* reveals the aim and tendency in the cosmos. The way, however, by which its end and, so to speak, its purpose is, and can only be accomplished, is that of morality, as must be stated in the science of ethics.

THE TRINITY OF MONISM.

§ 1. CAUSE, REASON AND FINIS.

THREE things are to be carefully distinguished in the idea of causality. 1. If a man acts, the motive that stirs him is the *cause* (ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως); 2. the law according to which he acts is his *character* (ἡ οὐσία), as the decision of his will depends on the quality of himself, *viz.*, his nature; and 3. the end pursued in his action is his purpose or *finis* (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα or τέλος). The man himself is what Aristotle calls ἡ ὑλη or τὸ ὑποκείμενον (*i. e.* literally: matter or subject); we should say *the object of our observation*, in which the change is noticed. And in the same way every phenomenon has 1. its *cause* and 2. obeys some general law, which explains the *ground or reason* of its occurrence, and 3. a *finis*, which may become eventually identical with its effect.

If some one asks, why powder explodes, he does not want to know the cause of a single case, for instance that of a recently discharged gun, but the *reason* of *any* powder explosion. The cause or occasion was some fact, some motion or alteration of circumstances, say the approach of a linstock to the touchhole. The reason, however, of this and of any explosion, is not a single fact or event, not an incident like the cause,—the reason of it is a *general law*, establishing some *truth* about the properties of the powder. And this truth must be carefully distinguished from cause. To call it a *general cause*, as Hume does, leads to a confusion just as bad as that of the ideas of first cause and final cause. This truth is not a concrete fact of some certain case of real and material

existence, but it contains a concept which in its abstractness applies to any case of its kind. It is not a *phenomenon* but a *law*.

Such a reason (in Latin, called *ratio*, in German, *Grund*) explains why in any case powder explodes. In the action of man, the cause applies merely to one transient act; the reason, however, explains, why the cause took effect according to his character in this instance as well as in any similar condition.

The *ὑποκείμενον* or object of observation, is, and always must be, under a certain *condition*, to explain which is sometimes of the greatest import, as the condition is usually accessory to the fact that the cause takes effect. Condition embraces the *state* of the object as well as the *circumstances* that surround it.

Every cause is the effect of some prior cause, and so *ad infinitum*, and every reason may be explained by some higher, *i. e.*, more general reason. Though the cause is antecedent to its effect, the reason is coexistent with the inference that follows from it.

The *finis* or *whither* in the motion of causation answers to the *whence*, *i. e.*, the reason or general law according to which some effect is produced. I observe *whither* the vane points to know *whence* the wind blows; and when all things fall to the ground toward the centre of the earth, the *finis* or *whither* of their motion corresponds to the general law of gravitation. In this way the attraction of things toward the earth is explained.

The *finis* consciously aspired to is called purpose. Thus purpose exists only on the condition of a rational will, and a man's purposes are inferences from his character, which represents the reason or general law that accounts for his aims. The *finis* or end may not be directly approachable. In such a case the motion of caus-

ality must pass through a medium, which in the activity of man we call *the means* that serve his purpose.

In every instance we can point out 1. the *cause* or the alteration of a state of things which under certain *conditions* calls forth a change, thus producing the *effect;* 2. the *reason* or *ground*, the question, *why does it happen?* The answer is a *general law* that holds good in all kindred cases; and 3. the *direction* of the motion, its *aim* and *end*, or as we style it, its *finis*. The *finis* of a conscious will is called *purpose*.

§ 2. EXAMPLES TO SHOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CAUSE AND REASON.

Temptation allied to the hope that the crime will not be discovered may perhaps cause a man to become a thief. At any rate, some event or incident must happen to induce a man to act in this way. And such an occurrence is the *cause*. The *reason*, however, for the committal of such a crime may be avarice, egotism, love for a starving family, or some other quality, which is, under certain circumstances, the begetter of thievishness.

Dr. James McCosh, in his essay on Energy, Efficient and Final Cause, page 4, says: "A picture-frame falls from a wall and breaks a jar standing on a table below; we say that the frame, or rather the fall of the frame, was the cause of the fracture of the jar. But the true cause, that which forever will produce the same effect, is the frame falling with a certain momentum and the brittleness of the jar." In this instance "the fall of the frame with a certain momentum" is the *cause*, and what Dr. McCosh calls "true cause," is no cause but the *reason*, establishing some truth about the properties of the jar and the frame, *viz.*, the brittleness of the jar and the weight of the frame, through which the effect is produced

in this and in any other case. There is no purpose in the breakage, yet there is some *finis* in the falling of the frame, and the jar happens to stand in its direction.

And further on Dr. McCosh uses another example; he says on page 7: "I was prompted to write a letter to a friend by my affection; but the occasion was his suffering a severe loss; the two actually called forth the letter." In this instance, the intelligence of my friend's severe loss is the *cause* that prompts me; but my affection (Dr. McCosh calls it "a cause steadily operating") is the *reason* why I feel prompted to write; and this produces, according to the law of friendship, the desire of comforting and, if possible, helping my friend in his emergency. The comfort and help of my friend is the aim and *finis* of my action, or as we usually say, it is the *purpose* of my writing the letter.

There is an old scholastic dictum, "*cessante causa cessat effectus;* if the cause ceases to exist, the effect does not exist any more." This is wrong, for the cause is passed whenever the effect is produced. If the murderer pulls the trigger of his gun, the shot goes off and his victim is struck. The first cause has passed, when the effect is produced. And this again is passed, when it inflicts the fatal wound. The cause passes away with its effect; the reason, however, remains in and with its inference. The inference disappears if the reason is abolished or counteracted.

The Romans kept their slaves in severe bondage. Their egotism was the reason of their severity. When Christianity conquered the world, more humane ideas spread, restraining as much as possible the barbarity of paganism. As the reason or ground of keeping slaves was thus checked, its inference ceased to exist, and in consequence of this, slavery became by and by impossible; it was abolished.

Emden was once a flourishing *Hansa-city*, because its situation on the banks of the Ems was exceedingly favorable. But its trade and commerce went almost to decay since the river altered its course. We ask, why? The answer is, *cessante ratione consequens cessat.*

This same law holds good if one reason is counteracted by another. For instance, powder is inflammable and explosive. Dampness counteracts its inflammability; let it be wet, and it will, in such a case, never be explosive.

§ 3. UNDERSTANDING, REASON AND JUDGMENT.

The faculty of mind, by which we perceive the causality of phenomena, is called *understanding*. It is that faculty which teaches us the use of our senses. For instance, we see some object: the beams of light which shine on the object are reflected and enter into our eye. So the effect of the presence of that object is its little picture on the retina of the eye. From this effect we infer the presence of the object before us, supposing it to be the cause of that picture. In this way it is not so much the eye that sees as the *understanding*, the eye being merely its organ or instrument of seeing. Without the power of understanding the eye is unable to see. A man may open his eyes wide in a swoon, yet he does not see; the pictures appear on the retina with the same accuracy as usual, but his understanding is paralyzed and does not translate these miniatures into real perception.

Understanding is a faculty which man shares with animals.

The faculty of mind which enables us to perceive the ground or reason, why causes operate thus and not otherwise, is called *reason*. Reason is among all creatures on earth the sole property of man. Reason not only affords knowledge of general and universal truths, but it is also

the capacity for abstraction, and so it creates concepts or general ideas. In consequence of this, reason produces *language*, and if fully developed, *science*, *viz.*: a methodically arranged system of knowledge.

The reason of some fact affords the explanation of the same in the form of a law. Such a law, though explaining all instances in which it is applicable, is simply the statement of some general truth and it in turn is susceptible of an explanation by some higher truth, by some more general law. To accomplish this task is the duty of science as it classifies and systematizes all laws, explaining the particular ones from the general and these from more general, in the hope of finding at length the most general or universal law, comprising and explaining all others. And this universal law is what we call the final principle of the world.

The chief characteristic of reason is its tendency toward establishing a unity wherever it is possible. And so it points by its very nature to a conception of a universal unity or to monism.

The faculty of mind which affords an insight into the *finis*, whither the cause tends, is generally and most properly called *judgment*. In a similar way we form a judgment, when we conclude in a logical syllogism, draw an inference and form an estimate; also when we make up our mind, we determine to act in a certain way on account of a judgment with regard to the probable end or *finis* of our action.

And so our intellect, in agreement with 1. cause, 2. ground (reason), and 3. *finis* in causality, consists of 1. understanding, 2. reason, and 3. judgment.

§ 4. UNIVERSE, COSMOS AND WORLD.

Thus monism establishes a unique and universal principle of the world permeating the whole cosmos. The world is an evolution of that one final principle and the single phenomena are so many single oscillations or undulations of the general motion of that grand stream rushing on from the eternity of the past to the eternity of the future.

Monism means, 1. a unity of *source* to which it traces the origin and explanation of all things and phenomena both spiritual and material, 2. a unity of *principle* animating the whole world, arranging the order of motion or the mechanics of causality, and 3. a unity of its *finis*. There is everywhere the same goal, whither the development of evolution tends.

Things are not single existences, but form one entire whole, which in its totality we call, with reference to point first, *the universe;* to point second, *the cosmos*, and to point third, *the world.* The first Latin word (*universe*) regards the *material* unity of things, the second, of Greek origin (*cosmos*), represents their unity of organization, the harmony of which is the regularity of *space*, and the third, (our old Anglo-Saxon term *world*, old German *werlde*, connected with modern German *werden*, to grow, to become) signifies the unity of growth in all objects, *i.e.*, the unity of all tendencies seemingly so different yet striving for and aspiring towards the same *finis*. It is the unity of *motion.*

§ 5. TRINITY AS RELIGIOUS IDEA.

As soon as the religious ideas of man are imbued with philosophical speculations, the conception of a deity is developed in natural course ; it may be in form of Mono-

theism or Pantheism. Certainly either view represents a religious ideal of monism. In Judaea it was Monotheism, and so it was in Arabia; in India we meet with Pantheism, and in Greece it is rather doubtful, whether the divine mind (νοῦς) of Anaxagoras and the God (θεός) of Plato, were monotheistic or pantheistic conceptions of the deity.

However, the unity of monism is not that of number, but of entirety; and in accordance with the treble enigma of the world, God is conceived as a trinity. Therefore we need not be astonished that the Christian trinity bears certain resemblances to Brahma, Vishnu, Shiva, the *trimurti* of the Indians, and to the trinity of the Neo-Platonists. Also the Edda, the bible of old Iceland, teaches a trinity of the Godhead, *Har*, *Efenhar*, *Thriti* (the High, the equally High and the Third), though the latter doctrine was probably influenced by Christianity.

The doctrine of trinity is by no means, as Mohammed thought, a relapse from the Jewish Monotheism toward pagan polytheism; but it is a progress in accordance with the natural evolution of religious ideas, a progress which the human mind naturally made, as it is based upon that other trinity exhibited in the law of universal causality.

ETHICS.

§ 1. RELIGIONISTS AND HEDONISTS.

ETHICS is the touchstone of any philosophy by which one may gauge its depth, its validity and its practicability. Of the system of Monism and Meliorism, as we propose it, ethics form an essential part, necessarily to be considered even in the mere outlines of the system. It should be stated beforehand, however, that it is not the province of philosophy *to preach morals*. That is the work of the preacher in the pulpit. Ethics is a science, and the philosopher has the more difficult task to substantiate and to lay the foundation for morals. The first question is: "Does it exist at all?" and the second: "What is its scientific basis? *i. e.*, what is the *reason* through which it exists?"

Throughout the history of the past, there have been two parties of which one may be called the *religionists*, the other *hedonists* or *utilitarians*. The religionists did not know of any other basis for ethics than religion, both being inseparable to them, and the hedonists declared that living morally and aspiring to happiness were synonymous. To the first party belong the faithful and orthodox believers of almost every creed; to the latter naturally freethinkers incline, as having no other or better foundation after getting rid of their dogmatic belief. Both parties are wrong and lack a real foundation of ethics. If ethics is nothing but the commandments of a God who is going to reward the obedient and punish the disobedient in another world, then religion exists—but no ethics. Morals in such a case are a kind of trans-

cendent and religious utilitarianism. And on the other hand, if you have to act well and to do good merely because it brings some advantages, as hedonism teaches, ethics does not exist either. And such ethics as Mr. Herbert Spencer proposes may correctly be called worldly wisdom, or prudence, or the art of living sensibly, or anything else, but not ethics.

§ 2. THE DOCTRINE OF FREE WILL.

Religionists usually adhere to the dogma of free will, while the hedonists do not accept this doctrine, but proclaim it to be in contradiction to the unyielding law of causality. It is the third of Kant's antinomies. The religionists take the positive side of the *thesis*, and the hedonists the negative of the *antithesis*. If there were no freedom of will, ethics would not exist, for it is freedom that implies the responsibilities for one's actions.

Now, according to the law of causality, the actions of man result through the same necessity as any event or phenomenon. It is a strange confusion to make of necessity and freedom a contradictory opposition, so that either would exclude the other. If a man can do as he pleases, we call him free ; but if he is prohibited from following motives which stir him, if by some *restraint* or *force* he is limited, he is not free. But every man, if he be free or restrained under a certain condition, under exactly these and no other circumstances must, of necessity, will just as he does will, and not otherwise. As to this, there is no doubt, if causality is truly the universal law of the world.

The confusion from which so many errors arise, is due to the similarity of the concepts *force* and *necessity*. Force may lay a restraint on free will. Where force rules, free will is annihilated. Necessity, however, is no force.

Whoever is unable to make this distinction, will never get a clear insight into the theory of free will. Necessity, in such a case, is the inevitable sequence by which a certain result follows according to a certain reason. It is the internal harmony and logical order of the world. Force, however, is an external restraint, and a foreign pressure exercised to check and hinder by violence. Give the loadstone freedom on a pivot, and it will turn toward the north, of necessity, according to the qualities or properties of magnetism. But if you direct it by a pressure of the finger to some other point, you will exercise some force, which does not allow it to show its real nature and quality. Were the loadstone endowed with sentiment and gifted with the power of speech, it would say in the first case: "I am free, and of my free will I point toward the north." In the second case, however, it would feel, that it is acted upon and forced into some other direction against its nature, and would declare its freedom to be curtailed.

It is the same with man; and the moral worth of a man depends entirely upon what motives direct his will. An ethical estimate of moral actions is not possible, except under the condition that they are the expression and realization of free will. The best action would amount to nothing, if it were a mere chance result which might have occurred otherwise. The chief value of any moral deed rests on the fact that the man *could not*, under the conditions, act otherwise than thus, that it was an act of *free will* and, at the same time, of inevitable *necessity*.

So we have succeeded in solving a problem, which to Kant was an antinomy of pure reason: and as we have in free will a basis for moral action, we may establish upon it a theory of ethics which will prove more satisfactory than that of the religionists or hedonists.

§ 3. KANT'S ETHICS.

Kant founds his morals on the *categorical imperative*. In his Critique of Pure Reason he teaches that throughout nature there is everywhere the strict inflexible rule of causality. But this thesis has its antithesis in the practical reason. In the domain of man, he says, liberty reigns, and instead of the rigid "*must*," he propounds the moral "*ought*," according to the categorical imperative. Schopenhauer justly criticizes Kant, showing that the establishment of an imperative is in reality an abandonment of an attempt to justify the law of morals. It is not a critical but a dogmatical way of philosophizing; and in plain words it means: as we must needs have morals and as I cannot give them any philosophical or scientific basis, I proclaim them as a guiding (or, as he says, regulative) law for human kind prescribed by practical reason.

So the categorical imperative is exactly the same way of teaching ethics as that of the religionists, who stand on the ten commandments given by God. Since, according to Kant, religion does not afford any longer a basis for ethics, and since he can not dispense with morals, he makes ethics absolute, standing on nothing, as though hovering in the empty space. That imperative is categorical and no question is answered as to its reason, justification or legitimation.

Ethics, as taught by dogmatic religion, is as though it were for children. God wills it so; therefore obey. By obedience children should show their love, confidence and reverence toward their parents. Obedience is the cardinal virtue required. And in the domain of religion, indeed, it could not be otherwise. For we must bear in mind that religion must attend to the spiritual wants and must satisfy the devout cravings and longings of the civ-

ilized races as well as of barbaric tribes. And Christianity takes the highest possible view, as it requires an obedience not from fear but from love. Religion is no philosophy, but serves other purposes. While philosophy explains ethics scientifically, religion simply preaches morals. Hence religious commandments have something personal about them. So they are liable to inspire enthusiasm, just as feudal allegiance made knights die for their lieges. Kant deprives the religious ethics of their poetic charm, leaving merely their grandeur and sublimity. Thus it comes to pass that we feel chilly among the glaciers on the Alpine hights of pure reason; and whereever such ethics are taught, we move in spheres of an abstraction which seems superhuman. Virtue is no longer fervid love; it is crystalized to ice, and frigid reflection has congealed all enthusiasm into the cold idea of duty, according to abstract rules; and morals no longer well up like the living waters of a spring, but operate like the correctly calculated gear of a machine.

According to the ethics of pure reason, that virtue is highest which is performed against our own inclination. Schiller, though an admirer of Kant, ridicules the rigidity of his ethics in one of his Xenions. The poet says:

"Willingly serve I my friends; but t'is pity, I do it with pleasure.
And I am really vexed, that there's no virtue in me!"

And he answers in a second distich:

"There is no other advice than that you try to despise friends,
And, with disgust, you will do what such a duty demands."

§ 4. OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM.

The religionist's and in the same way the transcendental philosopher's ethics are not satisfactory. But the hedonist has no right to scoff at or mock the theory, for

he gives nothing better. He is entangled in one fundamental error, and that is that he supposes man to be living in this world in order to be or to become happy. According to his theory, happiness is the aim and purpose of life, and all human aspiration serve this end. That is Mr. Herbert Spencer's doctrine, and the same is taught by Mr. Lester F. Ward in his Dynamical Sociology. This philosopher overlooks entirely the fact that happiness can not be defined. Happiness and its essence is too relative a thing. If it be the state of mind in which we feel at ease, I think that a well-fed pig is a more practical philosopher than any great man or sage. The felicity of man depends much more upon his character and his nature than upon any thing else; and a development of this will not necessarily evolve happiness. Quite the contrary! Very often, it will lead him into danger, destruction and death.

With regard to the optimism generally exhibited by the hedonists, I have to say in accordance with Schopenhauer, the great pessimist, that the world would be a failure, if its chief purpose were really happiness. We do not live to be happy. Our inmost nature compels us to perform some tasks in the service of some thing higher than our personal existence, be it in the field of science or art, be it by inventions or by extending trade and commerce or by the propagation and education of posterity; in one word, be it by any progress or improvement, we are compelled to do some thing in the service of humanity. And this task appears to us as a duty, which must be done even at the sacrifice of comfort, ease and happiness; and a successful performance of this duty is the highest, nay the only happiness of man.

Pessimism has been preached as religion and taught as philosophy; in either case it has vanquished optimism wherever they have met. Buddhism conquered the whole

of Eastern Asia, and it is still to-day the most widespread religion on earth. And to Christianity the western half of the world seems to be surrendered. Christianity, like Buddhism, is a pessimistic religion, which preaches that the world is bad in its foundation. The prince of this world is the devil, who allures and entices to transient sham happiness. Christ came into this life to suffer and die, in order that he might show the way of salvation. Man is a stranger, a pilgrim in this world, and destined to suffer for the purpose of purifying his soul. The symbol of christianity is the cross, an instrument of penal torture, and indeed in those times the most infamous one as crucifixion was the capital punishment for slaves and criminals.

Certainly, this world does not exist for happiness, or Christianity would not have subdued the most civilized races on earth. And in the province of philosophy, Schopenhauer has forever defeated optimism. He has proved conclusively that the commonly-looked-for happiness, which is usually sought, is an illusion, and that life itself is a boon of doubtful value which in most instances we would be better rid of. He characterizes himself with the words of Mephistopheles in Goethe's Faust:

> "I am the spirit that denies,
> And justly so, for all things from the void
> Called forth deserve to be destroyed;
> 'T were better then, were naught created."

§ 5. MELIORISM AND THE ETHICS OF MELIORISM.

But pessimism, though it was and ever will be victorious in the face of optimism, is not by any means what we should advocate as our contemplation of the world. We have not space to argue at length the *pro* and *con* of this question. However, what pessimism has taught is that life in itself has no value, yet that it may acquire

some by what it contains. If our days are empty of any action worthy to be done, then they are indeed spent as a tale that is told, although they may be four score years or more; yet is their strength labor and sorrow. For a life worthy to be lived is one that is full of active aspiration, for something higher and better; and such a contemplation of the world we call *meliorism*. Let the world be bad! our duty is to work with steady labor for its improvement. And this aspiration for enhancing and progressing, which dwells in our souls as a categoric imperative, is more than simply a regulative law, which we accept not so much for ourselves as for the benefit of the community and for the human race in general, through fear that egotism and anarchy will destroy society and ourselves into the bargain.

Meliorism and the ethics of meliorism have a better foundation. It is no mere regulative law, prescribing what ought to be, but it is a *natural law* ruling the development and progress of the world. Nor could it be otherwise. Let us spy into the nature of man as scientists spy into the objects of their studies, and we shall find, that the very core and inmost quality of the world is moral; not as the religionists or orthodox usually suppose, immoral; nor does it lead, as the hedonists imagine, to the happiness of egotism.

We believe that human society could not even exist, nor could have risen into existence, if there were not an ethical law governing the affairs of the world, especially those of man. Any social body is possible only on the basis of morality; and morality, though in an ampler sense of the word, is a universal law, ruling the universe and arranging progress in any development.

§ 6. MELIORISM AND THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

Darwin, no doubt, has been mistaken in many details of his system; there is, however, one point, which may be regarded as generally accepted by scientists, *viz.*, the theory of evolution. It is not at all proved, and scarcely ever can be, that all animals on earth descend from the same cell. It is, however, more than probable that every kind of being, as it exists at present, was not fully developed from the beginning, but had to pass through a long process of evolution. So the primordial life consisted of cells, and organisms arose from different combinations of the same.

Cells possess all properties of organic beings: alimentation, growth, and propagation. A mother-cell, having divided itself and thus produced new cells, is still connected with these filial cells, and in their union they are more fit to encounter the struggle for life. Henceforth the work to be done for their preservation is divided and dispensed in such a way that some cells perform one, other cells an other function for the unity thus created. It is division of work, according to a general plan; and that is what constitutes an organism. The single organ or limb of a body does not exist for itself any more, but serves the idea of a larger unity of which it feels itself to be a part. The purpose, aim and end of its existence is forthwith not in itself but in some thing higher than itself. This principle pervades all organic nature. Organisms can not exist but under this condition; and *this principle is ethical.*

The same principle which produced organisms and animals guides them in their further development; and only so far as any creature is animated by this ethical guidance is it able to develop into some higher thing. It is the star of Bethlehem that leads the foremost men of all

human races to the cradle where a new truth is born and the germ of a new idea is thriving. So man and the society of man rest on the same principle. The first higher unity is the family; families grow into tribes, and tribes form nations. The love of parents has broadened into patriotism, and no doubt the next higher ideal will be that of humanity. The next higher stage to which development ever tends is the *ideal*, and there will be no rest in the minds of the single individuals until this ideal is realized. After that, new ideals arise and lead on the interminable, infinite path of progress, not as Darwin says, merely ruled by the famous law of the struggle for life, but enhanced by the *strife for the ideal.*

§ 7. THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE NOT A MERE CONSTITUTIONAL BUT A NATURAL LAW.

This ethical principle is no mere constitutional law, proposed by a legislature as fitted to serve the majority. It is, as we have learned, a natural law pervading the universe; and a scientist must be blind to facts if he does not discover it. Even in the organic world, I venture to say, this law rules, though in a broader sense. Gravitation forms out of a whirlpool of gaseous materials well-arranged solar systems. It is the law of order and unity which dispenses to different bodies the different parts to be performed. The law of gravitation seems so plain and simple, and is so grand in its justice, that, according to the rules of pure mechanics, we perceive that it cannot be otherwise. It is the ethical law of primordial matter; and if the single atoms of a nebula which are ranging still in different directions, could tell us their ideal, it would be that of a fully-regulated solar system. The chaos will clear, according to simple mechanical rules,

the ideal will be realized, and the general turmoil will give way to order.

I could never understand how the theory of evolution could be arraigned for undermining the ethical feeling and moral aspirations of man. It will prove to be doing exactly the reverse. An ethical conception of life, we should say, is not possible without it.

The dogmatic theologian bases his morals on the ten commandments of Moses, ultimately resting on the authority of God. Now this is a sufficient foundation for morals to be preached to the people, but not for ethics to be scientifically justified and traced to their origin. The freethinkers, as represented by Mr. Spencer and others, have no ethics, though they may preach morals, and they are standing on the wrong principle that man lives to be happy. Let them rather look at the world as it is. True ethical aspiration produces happiness, though not to the aspiring individual. Look at the misery resulting from this strife! How many individuals sacrifice themselves for the ideal till some one of their successors striding over their dead bodies is at last victorious. Yet though successful, not even he is happy. Personally he does not reap the fruit of his trouble, and though the thorny crown of martyrdom may become his glory after his death, yet during his life he merely feels the pricks of the spines.

§ 8. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE IDEAL.

This world is not a world of happiness then, but of ethical aspiration. Its essence is evolution or a constant realizing of new ideals. True, it is the struggle for life; but if you look at it more exactly, is it life indeed, that the progressive part of humanity is striving for? No, they sacrifice even their lives for some higher purpose,

for the ideal. Would it not be a strange contradiction to say that people are consciously sacrificing and losing their lives in a struggle for life?

So according to the doctrine of monism and meliorism, to live naturally becomes identical with aspiring morally. The innate qualities and talents which appear to be presented by nature, and which therefore are justly called gifts, according to the theory of evolution are faculties inherited from ancestors. The labor of former generations is not lost; its fruit has been preserved and handed down to the generation now living. This fact has a profound ethical import! There is nothing without work in this world. That easy and apparently effortless production which we admire in genius, is not possible but by inherited abilities acquired by the labor of ancestors. The single man, therefore, ought to be conscious of being the product of the labor of ages. And what he does, be it evil or good, will live after him so far as his individuality impresses itself and influences his contemporaries. In consideration of this fact, man may think with more *reverence of the past*, and in respect to the *future* he will form his life with more *earnestness*.

Let us now return to Kant and his categorical imperative; he imagined that freedom and causality formed an antinomy, and so he teaches his doctrine of "*must*" in his Critique of Pure Reason, while that of the "*ought*" has its place in his Critique of Practical Reason. In the system of Monism the contradiction is eliminated so entirely, that the *must* and the *ought* are found, to some extent, identical. And just the theory of evolution widely criticized for a lack of ethics contitutes the *ought* as the main spring in the *struggle for the ideal.* Ask a man like Kepler or Gallileo, or any hero in science or art, or industry, or of any useful craft who during his life endured hardships and pain—ask James Watt, who gave almost the

whole time of his life, his best efforts, his property, small as it was, for his invention and did not reap the least part of the immense emoluments which it produced to later generations—ask any such man, whether he considers his life worth living. It may be that he endured often moments of despair, that he was tired of the many troubles and misery, and that, dying, he says: "I am glad that it is over! It is finished!" However, place again before him a new life, conscious of similar aspirations, give him an ideal and the hope of attaining it, and he will endure the same hardships, will suffer the same misery, will abstain from pleasure, resign happiness, merely for the great aim before his eyes, which becomes the purpose of his life.

§ 9. CONCLUSION.

The ethics of meliorism, as here explained, characterizes the general tendency of morality and traces moral actions to their source. However, it can not teach *a priori* what are the morals of to-day or yesterday, what is the ethical ideal of America, what is that of Germany, or that of England. The standard of morality is different, and the ideal of ethics is changing, according to the circumstances under which men live. Different conditions require different duties; and to different duties different moral ideals correspond. Usually we are inclined to judge the actions of men of past times, from the standpoint of the moral ideas of to-day. But that is entirely wrong, and many apparently barbarous deeds are jusitifiable—even right, with regard to the circumstances and requirements of their era. If some hero of olden times had acted according to the higher and better ideal of these latter days, it would have been considered (and sometimes perhaps justly) as weakness on his part. For

though the ethical tendency, aspiring toward amelioration, is the same throughout, yet the evolution of the ethical idea shows different stages. History traces the causes of these differences, and in every case must point out the reason by which it is changed in this or that way.

Yet the ideal is no mere fiction, it is a power of reality, pervading the universe as a law of nature ; and with regard to humanity it points out to man the path of progress. Progress, if it is guided by the ideal, will produce new and better eras for humankind. And if a moral tendency were not the fundamental law of nature, there could not be any advancement, development, or evolution.

As we judge about the character of a man from his actions, or rather from the purposes which he pursues, so we may learn also what the character of the final principle of the world is, from the *finis* or aim of its evolution. And so meliorism completes and supplements the doctrine of monism in establishing the truth that the final principle of the world is ethical.

DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

The following list of definitions will serve to explain the standpoint of *Monism*.

IDEALISM is that conception of the world which takes the *subject* as its starting-point.

According to Berkeley and his idealism the subject only exists and what we call things are the concepts of the subject. Such *outré* idealism is called spiritualism.

SPIRITUALISM explains the world solely from *spirit*, (*i. e.*, the substance of which the *subject* is supposed to consist), and assumes that matter does not exist.

[*Spiritualism* is to be carefully distinguished from *Spiritism*, the latter being the belief in spirits.]

CRITICAL IDEALISM. According to Kant, the subject is the datum of philosophy; and the subject's conceptions *a priori* (*i. e.*, space, time and pure reason) are transcendental. With objects we become acquainted by means of sensation. But objects as we conceive them in time and space are mere phenomena of the mind, time and space being subjective and applied to objects by and from the subject. So the things (or objects as they are for themselves and independent of our conception) can not be perceived or known.

REALISM is that concption of the world, which takes the *object* as its starting point.

Naturally scientists take this view, as it is sufficient for investigations in the single departments of nature. Philosophically, however, realism lacks a foundation, as it is an assumption to take the reality of the world granted beforehand.

MATERIALISM, or the *outré* realism, explains the world solely from *matter* (*i. e.*, the substance of which the object is supposed to consist). Spirit is merely a function of matter.

When realism, overshooting the mark, ventures to declare that cognition arises merely from sensations, as did Locke (and in such a case it is called *sensualism*) its consequence is *scepticism.*

SCEPTICISM (as taught by David Hume) is the conception of the world according to which exact cognizance is impossible.

MONISM takes in all cases the central position between the extremes. It establishes *one final principle,* producing all (1) *motion* in the world. The vehicle or agency of its efficacy is (2) *matter*, which means nothing more nor less than reality of existence. (3) *Space* is the form in which it is displayed. All regularity, all order, all arrangement is according to the laws of space. Even logical truths are demonstrated by mathematical figures. Time is merely the measure of motion. And so space, in its most abstract sense, means nothing more nor less than order.

1. All truths depending on space are accessible to *internal* cognizance.

2. All facts and phenomena produced by the properties of matter are accessible to *external* cognizance.

1. Internal cognizance is intuition, and so-called pure thought (by Kant styled *a priori.*)

2. External cognizance is sensation, and,

3. a scientific insight into nature is only possible by a combination of the two.

According to Monism

Idealism is right in so far that knowledge rests on internal cognizance (the transcendental ideas of Kant).

Realism is right in so far that the reality of things is proved by external cognizance (*i. e.*, experience by means of sensation).

Spiritualism is right in so far that the inmost principle of the world is a spiritual power.

Materialism is right in so far that all realities are material existences.

However,

Materialism is wrong in declaring matter to be the sole principle of the world. Matter is merely its outside, not the world itself.

Spiritualism is wrong in declaring that spirit exists independently of matter, spirit being merely the interior of the world, but not the universe.

Realism is wrong in assuming that space, time and the truths of pure reason are drawn from experience, or in other words, in denying the *a priori*.

Idealism is wrong in assuming that the transcendental ideas are subjective, or merely subjective; in other words, in denying the objectivity of time, space and the *a priori* truth generally.

The subject, though spiritual in its essence (if looked at from the inside or from the standpoint of the subject itself), is on the other hand a materially existing object.

And

Objects or things are no dead materials, merely fit to be acted upon; matter is animated everywhere by forces. Force is the intrinsic (and in some respects a spiritual) property of matter.

Force and *matter* are inseparable; and objective or material existences possess, according to the theory of

evolution, the ability of developing into conscious subjectivity. Thus it is proved that subjectivity is an intrinsic, though generally a latent quality of the objects (*i. e.*, matter.)

OPTIMISM is that view of life which takes for granted that the condition of things is good, or at least the best possible. Man lives in order to be or to become happy. Happiness is the aim and end of humanity.

Optimism was the naïve Grecian contemplation of life and also the ancient Indian faith of the Brahmans. Naturally all strictly theistic religions are optimistic; so is the Mosaic doctrine of the Old Testament and the Islam of Mohammed.

PESSIMISM holds that the world is bad and that man is to be redeemed or ransomed from the evil of existence. Meditative intuition and suffering are the way of salvation.

Whenever man commences to reflect on the purpose of life, pessimism will arise and will overwhelm the prior optimism. The pessimistic religions are the doctrines of Gautama Buddha as well as of Jesus Christ. The pessimistic philosopher of modern date is Arthur Schopenhauer.

MELIORISM has often been used in the sense that humanity, though at present not in a state of happiness, will nevertheless reach by and by such an existence, in which the miseries of our days will be impossible. That, however, is a kind of optimism. For in spite of all amelioration, happiness will remain about the same. It is relative, and Schopenhauer justly likens it to a fraction, the denominator of which represents our desires and the numerator their gratifications. Every progress allows to increase each of the two.

The source of error in pessimism is that life is supposed to be the purpose of life, or what means the same thing, that there is no purpose of life at all. This error is inherited from optimism; and from this standpoint, pessimism does not consider life to be worth its own troubles.

Monism, however, teaches that the cosmos has some destined end or *finis* which makes all lives parts of the universal display of life, and so there is some purpose in living beyond the range of the individual life. And so

MELIORISM, according to our view, accepts the truth of pessimism, that life for itself is without value. The value of life lies in what it contains; its worth is its weight or sum of labor performed in the aspiration after progress.

The virtues of OPTIMISM (as defined by Plato) are *1. continence or self-control, 2. courage, 3. wisdom*, and *4. justice*. It is what Schopenhauer calls *Bejahung des Willens zum Leben*, the affirmation of the will to life (*i. e.*, the intent of living).

The morality of PESSIMISM preaches humility. According to its teaching repentance is the beginning of a new life, and the trefoil of its virtues is *faith, hope* and *charity*. It is what Schopenhauer calls *Verneinung des Willens zum Leben*, denial of the will to life.

The ethical ideal of MELIORISM is WORK. The purpose of life and the duty of man is activity and labor in the service of amelioration. It is what Afred Weber calls *Wille zum Guten*.

Optimistic morality is *positive* and its essence is ennobled and elevated *egotism*. It represents the thesis of ethics.

Pessimistic morality is *negative* and its essence is *altruism;* it is the antithesis, apparently in contradiction to the first.